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Responding to Deficiencies in the Architecture of
Privacy: Co-Regulation as the Path Forward for Data
Protection on Social Networking Sites
Laurent Crépeau

*

Abstract
Social Networking Sites like Facebook, Twitter and the like are a ubiquitous part of
contemporary culture. Yet, as exemplified on numerous occasions, most recently in the
Cambridge Analytica scandal that shook Facebook in 2018, these sites pose major
concerns for personal data protection. Whereas self-regulation has characterized the
general regulatory mindset since the early days of the Internet, it is no longer viable
given the threat social media poses to user privacy. This article notes the deficiencies
of self-regulatory models of privacy and contends jurisdictions like Canada should
ensure they have strong data protection regulations to adequately protect the public.
However, while underscoring the economic value of Big Data technologies, it posits
regulation does not necessarily need to come at the cost of economic prosperity. By
adopting a co-regulatory model based on regulatory negotiation, various stakeholders
can come together and draft robust and flexible data protection regulations, including
both tailored rules and oversight mechanisms. Beginning with a survey of the
challenges and opportunities of Big Data and social networking sites (I), this article
then canvasses the data protection framework of three jurisdictions, namely the
United States, Canada, and the European Union (II). Finally, it shows the clear
advantages of co-regulation as a regulatory paradigm and offers an outline for the
regulation of social networking sites using regulatory negotiation (III).

INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which personally
identifiable data from as many as 80 million Facebook users was used by a
political consulting firm to craft targeted ads aimed at potential Republican
voters in the 2016 United States Presidential Election, 1 privacy regulation reentered the popular mind as an apparent critical problem to palliate, which only
a few weeks before seemed almost inessential. Of course, privacy protection is an
important issue — one to which an already immense amount of scholarship has
been dedicated.2 However, after a few years, it has largely been forgotten and it is
*

1

LL.M (New York University); B.C.L., J.D. (McGill University). The author would like
to thank Professor Richard Janda for his comments on a preliminary version of this
paper.
See Carole Cadwalladr, ‘‘I made Steve Bannon’s psychological warfare tool’: meet the
data war whistleblower”, The Guardian (18 March 2018), online: <www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-faceook-nix-bannon-trump>.
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unclear what has in fact changed in Facebook’s data protection practices, if
anything.3
Social Networking Sites (SNSs) are now at the forefront of privacy debates. 4
Yet, legislators often appear inefficient at implementing more robust regulations
on SNSs in spite of the scrutiny that they have received.5 Among other reasons,
this could be because the population is uncertain of the benefits of regulating
SNSs.6 This sentiment is predicated, for better or for worse, on an unwillingness
to see government regulation creep into the economic and social landscape. This
indecisiveness combined with the deregulation philosophy that prevailed during
the rise of the Internet naturally translated into the promotion of self-regulation,
that is, ‘‘a regulatory system in which business representatives define and enforce
standards for their sector with little or no government involvement.”7 To this
day, SNSs have greatly benefitted from this regulatory approach as it has given
them the leisure to develop free from burdensome regulation. 8

2

3

4

5

6

7

See Lee A Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014) at 8-17 (discussing the evolution of data privacy law discourse).
See Pete Evans, ‘‘Facebook sees biggest stock market value drop in history as growth
slows”, CBC (26 July 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/business/facebook-stockplunge-1.4762449>.
We define ‘‘social networking sites”, following Boyd and Ellison, as ‘‘web-based services
that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded
system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view
and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system.” See
danah m boyd and Nicole B Ellison, ‘‘Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship” (2008) 13:1 J Computer-Mediated Communication 210 at 211.
See Sean Kilpatrick, ‘‘Parliamentary report recommends modernizing Canada’s privacy
law”, The Globe and Mail (4 March 2018), online: <//www.theglobeandmail.com/
technology/parliamentary-report-recommends-modernizing-canadas-privacy-law/article38203771/> (‘‘[the report] also heeded repeated calls by the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada to be given enforcement powers with “teeth,” including the
right to impose fines and more flexibility to choose what to investigate”); Nuala
O’Connor, ‘‘Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy” (30 January
2018), online: Council on Foreign Relations <www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection> (‘‘Most Western countries have already adopted comprehensive legal protections for personal data, but the United States — home to some of the
most advanced, and largest, technology and data companies in the world — continues to
lumber forward with a patchwork of sector-specific laws and regulations that fail to
adequately protect data.”).
See Olivia Solon, ‘‘Americans ’evenly split’ over need to regulate Facebook and other big
tech”, The Guardian (1 November 2017), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/oct/31/americans-evenly-split-over-need-to-regulate-facebook-and-other-bigtech>; Nicole Riva, ‘‘Canadian content rules for online media have weaker support,
survey suggests”, CBC News (3 June 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/angusreid-crtc-canadian-content-1.3613646>.
See e.g. Dennis D Hirsch, ‘‘The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, SelfRegulation, or Co-Regulation?” (2011) 34 Seattle UL Rev 439 [Hirsch, “The Law”].
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However, SNSs have now become too important to be left alone. First, they
accrue immense amounts of personal information, the availability of which
impels us to redefine the boundaries of the private self.9 Second, opaque and
negligent uses, excessive tracking, and lax protections of data on SNSs’ part 10
pose real dangers to consumers’ rights.11 Third, with the powers of Big Data
technologies readily available, personal data can be analyzed and distilled into
extremely precise accounts of its users’ personalities and behaviours that can be
used to potentially nefarious ends.12
SNSs are as powerful today as ever. They constitute an extended public place
with unmatched capabilities to bombard subjects with information and often
accompany them in their most well-guarded intimacy. As such, they are used in
many fields, including, most prominently, business and politics as a gateway
inside people’s minds.13 As such, given the contemporary prevalence and
extensive reach of SNSs,14 their regulation is not only important in this day and
age, but necessary. A vast literature already exists on possible methods of
regulating SNSs.15 More recently, questions about regulating hate speech,
8

9

10

11

12

13

14

See John T Soma, Stephen D Rynerson & Erica Kitaev, Privacy Law in A Nutshell, 2nd
ed, (St. Paul: West Academic Publishing, 2014) at 156.
See John B Thompson, ‘‘Shifting Boundaries of Public and Private Life” (2011) 28:4
Theory, Culture & Society 49. Information hitherto considered strictly private
increasingly becomes a commodity among others for private and public actors. Notably,
China is currently establishing a ‘‘social credit system,” which plans to use surveillance
technology and personal data of citizens to reward them according to their ‘‘trustworthiness.” See Charles Rollet, ‘‘The odd reality of life under China’s all-seeing credit score
system”, WIRED (5 June 2018), online: <www.wired.co.uk/article/china-socialcredit>.
See Annalisa Merelli, ‘‘Facebook knew Cambridge Analytica was misusing users’ data
three years ago and only banned the company this week”, Quartz (17 March 2018),
online: <qz.com/1231643/cambridge-analytica-illegally-obtained-data-from-50-million-facebook-users-to-run-trump-ads/>.
See Maria LaMagna, ‘‘The sad truth about how much your Facebook data is worth on
the dark web” (6 June 2018), online: MarketWatch <www.marketwatch.com/story/
spooked-by-the-facebook-privacy-violations-this-is-how-much-your-personal-data-isworth-on-the-dark-web-2018-03-20> (Facebook and PayPal logins stolen by hackers
due to poor data protection are sold on the dark web for a handful of dollars, exposing
users to identity theft).
See e.g. Lesley Fair, ‘‘The FTC’s settlement with Facebook: Where Facebook went
wrong” (29 November 2011), online: United States, Federal Trade Commission
<www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2011/11/ftcs-settlement-facebookwhere-facebook-went-wrong>.
See e.g. Nicole Rustin-Paschale, ‘‘Online Behavioral Advertising and Deceptive
Campaign Tactics: Policy Issues” (2011) 19 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 907; Alexis C
Madrigal, ‘‘What Facebook Did to American Democracy”, The Atlantic, online:
<www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebook-did/542502/>.
See e.g. Chris Smith, ‘‘If you thought Facebook’s data collection is scary, wait until you
check your Google account”, BGR (28 March 2018), online: <bgr.com/2018/03/28/
google-vs-facebook-user-data-collection/>.
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misinformation16 and political campaigning on social media have come to the
forefront.17 Many people see the spread of extreme political discourse as
worrisome given the audience they can potentially reach using SNSs. Moreover,
analyzing personal data to win elections now reaches bafflingly high degrees of
effectiveness, targeting specific strata of the undecided voter population with just
the right advertisement to make them change their mind.18
Self-regulation has had a prominent role in shaping the regulatory landscape
of data protection. In the early years of the Internet, before SNSs like Facebook
and Twitter became well-established names, this regulatory model which had
come to characterize the regulation of various aspects of the Internet was already
being criticized19 and has remained controversial throughout Facebook, Twitter
and other SNSs’ growth.20 Many authors continue to favour it21 while also
suggesting improvements to make this approach adequate while retaining its
defining liberal, free-market approach to regulation.22
15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

See generally Eva Lievens & Peggy Valcke, ‘‘Regulatory Trends in a Social Media
Context” in Monroe E Price, Stefaan Verhulst & Libby Morgan, eds, Handbook of Media
Law (London: Routledge, 2013) 557.
See Jack Nicas, ‘‘Alex Jones and Infowars Content Is Removed From Apple, Facebook
and YouTube”, The New York Times (6 August 2018), online: <www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/06/technology/infowars-alex-jones-apple-facebook-spotify.html>. The increasing prevalence of hate speech online has already pushed EU regulators to react
with its Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online. See Hui Zhen Gan,
‘‘Corporations: The Regulated or The Regulators? The Role of IT Companies in
Tackling Online Hate Speech in the EU” (2017) 24 Colum J Eur L 111. See Karen Hao,
“How Facebook and Google Fund Misinformation”, (20 November 2021), online: MIT
Technology Review <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/11/20/1039076/facebook-google-disinformation-clickbait/>
See Eitan D Hersch, Hacking the Electorate: How Campaigns Perceive Voters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Timothy Summers, ‘‘Facebook is killing democracy with its personality profiling data”,
The Conversation (21 March 18), online: <theconversation.com/facebook-is-killingdemocracy-with-its-personality-profiling-data-93611>; Tahiat Mahboob, ‘‘How Facebook was Harnessed to Micro-Target Voters and Promote Donald Trump”, CBC (28
March 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/passionateeye/features/how-facebook-was-harnessed-to-micro-target-voters-and-promote-donald-trump>.
See e.g. Jonathan P Cody, ‘‘Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the Time Come to
Abandon Self-Regulation?” (1999) 48:4 Cath U L Rev 1183; Mary J Culnan, ‘‘Protecting
Privacy Online: Is Self-Regulation Working?” (2000) 19:1 J Pub Pol’y & Marketing 20.
See Hirsch, “The Law,” supra note 7; Asma Vranaki, ‘‘Regulating Social Networking
Sites: Facebook, Online Behavioral Advertising, Data Protection Laws and Power”
(2017) 43 Rutgers Computer & Tech LJ 168.
See e.g. Catherine Schmierer, ‘‘Better Late Than Never: How the Online Advertising
Industry’s Response to Proposed Privacy Legislation Eliminates the Need for Regulation” 17:4 Rich JL & Tech 1.
See e.g. Timothy E Deal, ‘‘Moving Beyond ‘Reasonable’: Clarifying the FTC’s Use of Its
Unfairness Authority in Data Security Enforcement Actions” (2016) 84:5 Fordham L
Rev 2227; Ira S Rubinstein, Ronald D Lee & Paul M Schwartz, ‘‘Data Mining and
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This article echoes much of the criticism already made of self-regulation and
offers additional arguments for its insufficiency in the context of SNSs. It argues
that commitment to a co-regulatory approach is necessary to ensure the proper
regulation of SNSs’ data protection practices while fostering innovation and
profitable access to data for SNSs and their business partners. Co-regulatory
models favour implementing clear data protection obligations for SNSs and
empowering regulators with new powers to monitor SNS data protection
practices. At the same time, it looks to keep the most useful aspects of selfregulation to facilitate sophisticated and context-specific rulemaking and
information-sharing.
Part I gives an overview of the shortcomings of SNSs’ data protection
practices, looking specifically at the problems posed by online behavioural
advertising and third-party data sharing. Part II looks at data protection laws in
the United States, Canada, and the European Union. Finally, Part III
underscores the failures of self-regulation and proposes a co-regulatory
approach that promotes transparency and accountability through framework
legislation and regulatory negotiations to balance the economic benefits of data
with adequate protection.

PART I: THE DATA LANDSCAPE AND SOCIO-CULTURAL AND
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DATA
In this Part, we begin by briefly describing the main aspects of Big Data as
regards personal data processing and the data-driven economy. Combined with
technologies available today, advertisers and other third parties can garner
immense economic benefits from the use of personal data. As such, data
processing and sharing practices should not be entirely stopped — if monitored
appropriately, consumers and various industries could reap major benefits from
personal data processing. Trends from consumer behaviour surveys, as well as
the concepts of architecture of disclosure and privacy paradox, allow us to
nevertheless understand the crucial importance of regulating data practices of
SNSs, since they underscore the inefficiency of market forces to induce adequate
privacy practices in SNSs. Finally, we examine online behavioural advertising
and data disclosures by SNSs to third parties and demonstrate the risks of each
practice.

(a) Setting the Table: Data, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, the DataDriven Economy, and the Social Media Revolution
‘‘Data represents the lowest raw format of information or knowledge.” 23
‘‘Big Data can be defined as volumes of data available in varying degrees of

23

Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches” (2008) 75 U
Chicago L Rev 261.
Krish Krishnan, Data Warehousing in the Age of Big Data (Waltham, MA: Elsevier,
2013) at 3.
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complexity, generated at different velocities and varying degrees of ambiguity,
that cannot be processed using traditional technologies, processing methods,
algorithms, or any commercial off-the-shelf solutions.”24 As this definition
alludes to, Big Data is often characterized by its singular dimensions, called the
‘‘three Vs”: Volume (that is, the amount of data), Velocity (that is, the speed at
which data is collected, used, and disseminated), and Variety (that is, the multiple
types and sources of data).25 Sometimes, a fourth V is added for Veracity, which
directs attention to the possible inaccuracy of data,26 or Value, referring to the
economic value derived from Big Data.27 SNSs process immense quantities of
data through mining technologies that allow the rapid organization of troves of
data. Among these technologies, artificial intelligence (‘‘AI”) tools are used to
analyze widely different forms of data to discern various patterns and note their
significance based on a set of algorithms. A prominent example is machine
learning, which can be defined as a ‘‘knowledge discovery and enrichment
process where the machine represented by algorithms mimics human or animal
learning techniques and behaviours from a thinking and response perspective.”28
Machine learning is essentially a self-learning technique that requires minimal
human intervention and can thus facilitate automation. Its powers are often used
by SNSs when collecting data to accrue personal data, discern patterns, and craft
online persona, which are then attributed to users. These profiles are then used to
target individual, personally-based content.29
Since the late 20th century, ever more sophisticated technologies and
processing architectures have led to increasingly powerful tools to analyze
complex and vastly different types of data sets.30 To illustrate how powerful Big
Data and AI can be, let us take the example of the personal data generated by
Facebook. Every second, thousands of clicks from millions of users are gathered.
These serve to track each user’s choices and navigations on Facebook’s interface
— every status update, post, comment, or page ‘‘liked”, visited, or made by the
user is taken and processed by Facebook. Given Facebook’s 1.45 billion daily
active users worldwide, this tracking creates massive volumes of data to process
constantly.31 In addition to user-generated content produced on a day-to-day
24
25
26

27

28
29

30

Ibid. at 5.
Ibid. at 15.
See e.g. Victoria L Rubin, ‘‘Veracity Roadmap: Is Big Data Objective, Truthful and
Credible?” (2014) 24:1 Advances in Classification Research 1, online: context=fims
pub>.
See Maurice E Stucke & Allen P Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016) at 15ff.
Krishnan, supra note 23 at 236.
See Abdul Muhammad, ‘‘AI’s Hidden Patterns Transform Content, Marketing and
Advertising on Facebook” (20 February 2018), online: Ad Age <www.adweek.com/
digital/abdul-muhammad-rbb-communications-guest-post-ai-facebook/>.
See OECD, Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being (Paris: OECD
Publishing, 2015) at 23.
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basis, SNSs also collect information such as name, email address, mailing
address, telephone number, credit card number, IP address, browser type,
operating system, Internet service provider, URLs of sites from which a user
arrives or to which a user goes when leaving the service’s website, interactions
with third-party services like surveys and polls, country, gender, location,
information generated when the SMS account is used to log in to a third-party
website or application, date of birth, interests, hobbies, lifestyle choices, groups
with which one is associated (i.e., company, school), search queries, and private
messages and their metadata.32 Distilling this data to extract trends and patterns
greatly depends on flexible technologies that are not only able to take in
mountains of disparate data, but are also able to process them quickly,
effectively, and with a fair degree of accuracy.33
Seeing as the worldwide production of data is expected to continue to widely
increase over time, 34 data processing technologies receive considerable
investments annually from the private sector and are refined with the help of
emerging technologies like AI.35 This ever-greater capacity of distilling massive
amounts of information into a meaningful format has major economic potential.
Even more significant is the fact that SNSs and the Internet provide an entirely
new medium over which people’s lives can extend. Contrary to real life, however,
every single action can be documented, which allows the creation of consistently
more accurate individual user portraits detailing each user’s personality and
behaviour.
More than being simply saturated with information, in a data-driven
economy, SNSs are effective and far-reaching sources of data because they elicit
rich user interaction with their platform to achieve important concentrations of
highly personalized data. The insight to be gained from analyzing this data is
incomparable — no one source of data is as complete and tailored as an SNS.
Through the various actions it offers each user, a given SNS can accumulate as
much as several gigabytes of information on an individual. 36 With hundreds of
31

32

33
34

35

36

This is as of April 2018. See See Josh Constine, ‘‘Facebook beats in Q1 and boosts daily
user growth to 1.45B amidst backlash”, TechCrunch (25 April 2018), online:
<techcrunch.com/2018/04/25/facebook-q1-2018-earnings/>.
See Adam I Cohen, Social Media: Legal Risk and Corporate Policy (New York: Wolters
Kluwer, 2013) at 117-18.
See Krishnan, supra note 23 at 5.
See McKinsey & Company, Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and
Productivity (McKinsey & Company, 2011) at 6 (global data generated annually is
projected to increase by 40%).
See NewVantage Partners, Big Data Executive Survey 2018: Data and Innovation: How
Big Data and AI are Driving Business Innovation (Boston: NewVantage Partners, 2018) at
9, online: <newvantage.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Big-Data-Executive-Survey-2018-Findings.pdf> (97.2% of respondent firms invest in Big Data or Artificial
Intelligence).
See Dylan Curran, ‘‘Are you ready? Here is all the data Facebook and Google have on
you”, The Guardian (30 March 2018), online: <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
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millions if not billions of daily users, all of whom are interconnected in various
ways, SNSs are consequently among the most actual and well-supplied sources of
personal information. They are also among the most consistent sources of
worldwide personal data — since millions of people from all across the world
possess social media accounts, SNSs make available information about the
minds and habits of peoples from most geographical areas.
Ultimately, this data provides a powerful blueprint for a consumer’s intimate
thoughts, worldview, and interests — on a macro and micro scale. When
analyzed using today’s technologies, personal data can be distilled into individual
user profiles using AI technologies, which offer advertisers, businesses, and
researchers a significant tool they can use to market their products and reach new
audiences.37 This goes as far as processing information with AI algorithms to
target ads not only for precise product types that a consumer has shown interest
in, but also related products in anticipation of that consumer’s developing and
potential interests. For example, an SNS could find that a given consumer, even
though they never considered becoming vegetarian, is likely to become
vegetarian within two years. The consumer could therefore be targeted with
more advertising related to vegetarianism in the future.38
These tools will inevitably continue to prove useful in an increasingly servicedriven economy.39 In one 2016 survey, only 5.4% of consulted firms stated that
they did not have any Big Data initiative or plan to introduce one. 40
Furthermore, a 2018 report by McKinsey & Company estimated that ‘‘AI
could potentially deliver additional economic output of around $13 trillion by
2030, boosting global GDP by about 1.2 percent a year.”41
In short, there are major economic benefits to Big Data. Their importance is
not negligible and should counsel nuance when evaluating potential regulation
efforts.42 Given the breadth of information coming from social media, it is

37

38

39
40

41

42

2018/mar/28/all-the-data-facebook-google-has-on-you-privacy> (the author of this
piece found that Google had accumulated over 5.5GB of data on them — the equivalent
of millions of Microsoft Word documents).
This is most evident in the profitability of targeted advertising, which has been calculated
to yield revenues 2.68 times greater than non-targeted advertising. See National
Advertising Initiative, ‘‘Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads More Than Twice As
Valuable, Twice As Effective As Non-Targeted Ads Online”, (24 March 2010), online
(pdf): National Advertising Initiative <www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/NAI_Beales_Release.pdf>.
See Frederik J Zuiderveen Borgesius, Improving Privacy Protection in the Area of
Behavioural Targeting (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer International, 2015) at 83.
See Krishnan, supra note 23 at 15.
NewVantage Partners, Big Data Executive Survey 2016: An Update on the Adoption of
Big Data in the Fortune 1000 (Boston: NewVantage Partners, 2016) at 5.
See McKinsey & Company, Notes from the AI Frontier: Modeling the Impact of AI on the
World Economy (Brussels: McKinsey & Company, 2018) at 3.
See David A DeMarco, ‘‘Understanding Consumer Information Privacy in the Realm of
Internet Commerce: Personhood and Pragmatism, Pop-Tarts and Six-Packs” (2006)
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nonetheless crucial to closely monitor the impact that these technologies can
have on privacy and a person’s integrity. However, as we show in the next
section, these benefits come, in practice, at the expense of consumers, as insights
from behavioural economics demonstrate that SNS users are reluctant to change
their privacy practices despite the genuine interest they might have in protecting
their data.

(b) An ‘‘Architecture of Disclosure” and the Privacy Paradox
The primary purpose of SNSs is for individuals to connect with each other
with reduced barriers of time and energy required for interactions to take place. 43
People overwhelmingly engage in SNSs for this purpose — a strong social
imperative exists in that regard.44 However, despite surveys suggesting people
care about their privacy, when the risks and shortcomings of SNSs are pointed
out to them, users tend not to change their behaviour.45 This is generally known
as the Privacy Paradox.46 One might interpret this behaviour as disclosing a lack
of genuine interest in privacy. However, a great part of this behaviour is rooted
in a utility calculus rooted in what people see as the basic purpose of SNSs: the
relationship to a network of people that provides connection47 and allows for
self-disclosure.48 In a survey of Facebook users, it was found that only 35.9% of
participants would be willing to change to a SNS that guarantees them more
privacy.49 Among those, a third would switch only if their social network would

43

44
45

46

47

48

49

84:4 T L Rev 1013 (arguing the dangers of Internet commerce as regards information
privacy are occasionally overestimated and overemphasized and that, as such, they end
up obscuring its economic benefits). Paul M Schwartz & Daniel J Solove, ‘‘The PII
Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information” (2011) 86
NYUL Rev 1814 (arguing academics should not underestimate the economic effects of
too-radical solutions such as stopping the flow of information altogether). Contra Paul
Ohm, ‘‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization” (2010) 57 UCLA L Rev 1701 (suggesting a reduction in data flow).
See José Marichal, Facebook Democracy: The Architecture of Disclosure and the Threat
to Public Life (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012) at 40.
Ibid. at 34.
See Wouter Martinus Petrus Steijn, ‘‘The Cost of Using Facebook: Assigning Value to
Privacy Protection on Social Network Sites Against Data Mining, Identity Theft, and
Social Conflict” in Serge Gurwith, Ronald Leewes, & Paul de Hert, eds, Data Protection
on the Move: Current Developments in ICT and Privacy/Data Protection, (Dordrecht:
Springer, 2016) 323 at 323.
See e.g. H Brian Holland, ‘‘Internet Expression in the 21st Century: Where Technology
and Law Collide: Privacy Paradox 2.0” (2010) 19 Widener L J 893.
See Judith Donath, ‘‘Signals in Social Supernets” (2007) 13:1 J Computer-Mediated
Communication 231.
See Andrew M Ledbetter et al, ‘‘Attitudes Toward Online Social Connection and SelfDisclosure as Predictors of Facebook Communication and Relational Closeness” (2011)
38:1 Communication Research 27.
See Steijn, supra note 45 at 333.
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be willing to switch as well.50 ‘‘In other words, the social utility of SNSs appears
to be the primary reason individuals make use of the sites and thus have to accept
the potential privacy threats as a cost for participation.”51 As such, despite the
spectre of grave privacy violations hovering over SNS users, the allure of SNSs is
such that consumers are induced to refrain from making more rational choices,
such as choosing more secure SNS options. A further illustration of this is a
study which claims only 9% of Americans deleted their Facebook account
following the reveal of the Cambridge Analytica scandal. 52 Considering the
scandal was by far Facebook’s greatest controversy to this day and touched on
some of the most fundamental aspects of privacy, this number reveals the weight
utility takes over privacy.
Taking advantage of this situation, SNSs can then induce consumers into
divulging more and more private information by setting up their interface to
favour disclosures. In the context of Facebook, Marichal compellingly describes
these characteristics as forming a choice architecture.53 In our view, this
observation also applies to other major SNSs like Twitter, Instagram, and
LinkedIn. A choice architecture derives from a behavioural economics
institutionalist approach to decision-making and posits that ‘‘institutions can
influence decision-making by structuring choice so that the costs associated with
an institution’s desired behaviour is [sic] significantly lower than the behaviour
desired by the individual ceteri paribus.”54 As such, despite users’ earnest wishes
to protect their privacy, SNSs are set up so as to induce disclosure of their
information. Notably, default settings are aimed towards allowing disclosures of
information because people will seldom take the time to change them, let alone
become aware that they can be changed.55 More subtly, by making highly visible
activity from other people in their network,56 and providing users with the
opportunity to choose to receive highly personalized content based on their
interests,57 the SNS is encouraging users to disclose in turn — thereby creating
more insightful personal data for SNSs to analyze and re-use. Thus, through
providing consistently more content to meaningfully engage with, SNS create a
50
51
52

53

54
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Ibid. at 336.
Ibid.
A further illustration of this can be found in an assessment of the #DeleteFacebook
movement, which claims that only 9% of Americans deleted their Facebook account
following the Cambridge Analytica scandal. See Carolina Milanesi, ‘‘US Consumers
want more transparency from Facebook”, (11 April 2018), online: Tech.pinions
<techpinions.com/us-consumers-want-more-transparency-from-facebook/52653>.
See Marichal, supra note 43 at 37. The concept of ‘‘choice architecture” was coined and
developed in Richard H Thaler & Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about
Wealth, Health and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
See Marichal, supra note 43 at 38.
Ibid. at 39.
Ibid. at 40.
Ibid. at 37.
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choice architecture that ultimately leads to more disclosures of personal data. 58
In such a context, SNSs and their business partners are set to reap great
economic benefits from their users. Given the wide breadth of information
available on SNSs, the dangers of this data spreading on the Internet through
online behavioural advertising and third-party data sharing and subsequently
being used to cause individual SNS users harm are nothing short of alarming, as
we explain below.

(c) Online Behavioural Advertising
Advertising is the main source of profit for SNSs.59 Since its early years, the
Internet has established a path for the advertising industry to reach new
audiences. However, new tracking technologies developed a few years in its
infancy allowed for the expansion of the already well-established practice of
targeted advertising into online behavioural advertising (that is, ‘‘the practice of
tracking consumers’ activities online to target advertising”60) created one of the
greatest obstacles to Internet privacy. This hazard is exacerbated by social media.
Starting the 1970s, advertising became a much more fragmented art.
Advertisers became interested in targeting specific groups of people with
advertisements aimed at particular segments of the population. 61 In the 1980s
and 1990s, ‘‘direct marketing progressed to database marketing,” which entails
‘‘the use of consumer databases to enhance marketing productivity through more
effective acquisition, retention, and development of customers.” 62 This historical
step led to the increasing accumulation of consumer data.63 Once the Internet
became widely accessible, it was only a matter of time before the practice grew
and progressively achieved ever-greater segmentations and precision as it honed
in further on its multifaceted targets.64 New Internet technologies, including AI,
now allow advertisers to track users on an ongoing basis and use the accrued
data to extrapolate patterns from their online behaviour to target ads with ever
greater precision and efficiency.65
On the Internet, advertising revenues are usually based on a cost-per-click
(whereby the advertiser is paid according to the number of clicks an ad receives
from Internet users) or cost-per-conversion (where the advertiser is paid according
to the number of times that an Internet user clicks on an ad redirecting them to
58
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Ibid.
See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 27 at 54.
Julia Zukina, ‘‘Accountability in a Smoke-Filled Room: The Inadequacy of SelfRegulation Within the Internet Behavioral Advertising Industry” (2012) 7 Brooklyn J
Corporate, Financial & Commercial L 277 at 277.
See Zuiderveen Borgesius, supra note 38 at 17.
Ibid. at 18.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 1.

422 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[19 C.J.L.T.]

an advertising client’s website and performs a pre-determined action) basis. As a
result of these models, an advertiser or advertising network’s 66 success depends
entirely on an advertisement’s persuasion and effectiveness. 67 With most major
SNSs being usually available to consumers for free, given that these services
require the maintenance of an expensive web architecture and supporting
institutions, monetizing the very capital they generate — personal data — was a
natural course of action for SNSs to take. Combining their platform’s undeniable
popularity — and the consequently wide user base continually producing troves
of personal data — with perpetually refined technologies in order to generate
insightful behavioural accounts of large swaths of the population made them the
perfect contenders in the race to become the most powerful advertisers on the
Internet.

(i) Overview of Online Behavioural Advertising and Data Practices of Major
SNSs
For this study, we looked at the privacy policies of six major SNSs:
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+ and YouTube (the latter two
being owned by Google and therefore falling under the purview of the Google
Privacy Policy).68 The advertising practices of SNSs mostly share similar
characteristics, with some exceptions that mostly relate to partnerships with
other advertising and analytics firms. These practices, from a data protection
standpoint, can have major implications, which, in turn, raise important
questions as to how effective SNSs are at regulating themselves as regards the
personal data of their users.
Each of the SNSs studied offers their own advertising interface through
which firms can place an ad on their respective social media platform. 69 Firms
66

67
68

69

An advertising network, sometimes shortened to ‘‘ad network,” is a company that
connects advertisers to website publishers in order to serve ads on websites. Ibid. at 16.
Ibid. at 18.
See Facebook, ‘‘Data Policy” (19 April 2018), online: Facebook <www.facebook.com/
policy.php> [Facebook Privacy Policy]; Facebook, ‘‘Cookies and Other Storage
Technologies” (4 April 2018), online: Facebook <www.facebook.com/policies/cookies/
> [Facebook Cookies Policy]; Twitter, ‘‘Privacy Policy” (25 May 2018), online: Twitter
<twitter.com/en/privacy> [Twitter Privacy Policy]; LinkedIn, ‘‘Privacy Policy” (8 May
2018), online: LinkedIn <www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy> [LinkedIn Privacy
Policy]; LinkedIn, ‘‘Cookies Policy” (8 May 2018), online: LinkedIn <www.linkedin.com/legal/cookie-policy> [LinkedIn Cookie Policy]; Instagram, ‘‘Privacy Policy” (19
January 2013), online: Instagram <help.instagram.com/155833707900388>; Instagram, ‘‘Data Policy” (19 April 2018), online: Instagram <help.instagram.com/
519522125107875> [Instagram Data Policy]; Google, ‘‘Google Privacy Policy” (25
May 2018), online: Google <policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en> [Google Privacy
Policy].
See Facebook, ‘‘Facebook Ads” (11 August 2018), online: Facebook <www.facebook.com/business/products/ads>; Twitter, ‘‘Twitter Ads” (11 August 2018), online: Twitter
<ads.twitter.com/campaign/>; Instagram, ‘‘Advertising on Instagram” (11 August
2018), online: Instagram <business.instagram.com/advertising/>; LinkedIn, ‘‘Linke-
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can customize their ad depending on the type of marketing campaign they
envisage and choose specific targeting parameters, including demographics,
behaviours, and interests, to circumscribe the ad’s audience. These parameters
can be very broad (for instance, ‘‘the United Kingdom”) or finely tuned (for
example, ‘‘interested in BBC’s 1995 TV adaptation of Pride and Prejudice”).
They can also be a combination of individual user characteristics such as ‘‘People
in Brazil who like high-value goods.”70 Through the process of manufacturing
the ad, firms do not have direct access to personal data accumulated by the SNS.
They only tell the SNS who to target with their ad and the SNS does it for
them.71
At this point, SNSs’ use of personal data is arguably reasonable. In exchange
for providing a service — one that, manifestly, consumers greatly appreciate —
user-generated content and other freely-disclosed information are used by the
SNS in order to profit from advertising that will generally be of some interest to
users. Consumers have an opportunity to read terms of services, including the
SNS’s legislatively mandated privacy policy, which gives them the opportunity to
decline to engage in the service if they are not satisfied with its terms. 72
Moreover, at the end of the day, both consumer and service provider benefit
from their respective actions. Furthermore, if access to personal data by thirdparties is limited to prevent any considerable risk of identification and
appropriate privacy protection measures are taken to preserve users’ personal

70

71

72

dIn Ads” (11 August 2018), online: LinkedIn <business.linkedin.com/marketingsolutions/ads>; Youtube, ‘‘YouTube Advertising” (11 August 2018), online: Youtube
<www.youtube.com/yt/advertise/>; Google, ‘‘Google Ads — Google+” (11 August
2018), online: Google+ <plus.google.com/+GoogleAds>.
These examples were taken directly from Facebook’s ad interface. See Facebook, ‘‘Ads
Manager” (29 July 2018), online: Facebook <www.facebook.com/adsmanager/creation?act=191051970974205&filter_set>.
This aspect of the advertising process on social media has been the cause of acute unease
on the part of the public, which has led many SNSs to clarify that they ‘‘do not sell their
data.” See e.g. Facebook, ‘‘Does Facebook sell my information” (2018), online:
Facebook Help Centre <www.facebook.com/help/152637448140583?helpref=related>. This exact point was reiterated by Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg in his
testimony before Congress. See Kaleigh Rogers, ‘‘Let’s Talk About Mark Zuckerberg’s
Claim that Facebook ’Doesn’t Sell Data’”, Motherboard (11 April 2018), online:
<motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/8xkdz4/does-facebook-sell-data>.
While the extent to which a consumer should be expected to read boilerplate legalese or
terms of services in general can be debated, we agree with multiple scholars that they
nonetheless have an obligation to take actions to protect their privacy, including their
personal data. See e.g. Anita L Allen, ‘‘Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big Data
Economy” (2016) 130 Harv L Rev F 71; Eugene E Hutchinson, ‘‘Keeping Your Personal
Information Personal: Trouble for the Modern Consumer” (2015) 43 Hofstra L Rev
1151. See also Daniel J Solove, ‘‘Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the
Consent Dilemma” (2013) 126 Harv L Rev 1880 (arguing that consenting to data
collection and sharing practices is not enough, as it does not grant people meaningful
control over their data).
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data from privacy breaches, then a compromise between privacy and reasonable
use of personal data for economic purposes might be struck.
The current situation is not so rosy, however. First, SNSs use cookies, that is,
small text files that a server can send to an Internet browser. Cookies allow a
website publisher or a third party to track people’s actions on the Internet 73 and
to monitor consumers’ interests and browsing patterns outside of their respective
ecosystems.74 Even more shocking is the fact that SNSs stalk consumers on the
web whether or not they have an account with them.75 This is normally done
through plugins allowing users to share a given webpage on different SNSs. In
such cases, the website publisher has approved the plugin’s addition and includes
it as part of its cookie policy, which users are normally prompted to approve
when they visit the website.76 Already, this poses a major problem as regards
informed consent, which is crucial for this sort of data collection to be in any way
legitimate. For one, consumers who do not subscribe to an SNS have no genuine
way of consenting to the collection of their information in the first place.
Moreover, even subscribed consumers could not be said to have consented to the
aggregation of their information outside an SNS. A regular customer would
most likely not imagine that an SNS’s tracking practices extend this far, for one.
Furthermore, tracking practices are not clearly highlighted in many privacy
policies — one has to dig deep to find the information hidden in an SNS’s
privacy policy.77
Second, SNSs often collaborate with third-party advertising networks to
place advertisements using SNS-gathered data outside of their respective SNS
ecosystem. This practice is problematic. First, it relies on enhanced tracking
73
74

75

76
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See Zuiderveen Borgesius, supra note 38 at 17.
Far from being a veiled practice, many SNSs admit to doing so in their Privacy Policy.
See e.g. LinkedIn Privacy Policy, supra note 68 at 1.8; Facebook Cookies Policy, supra
note 68; Twitter, ‘‘Privacy Control for Personalized Ads” (29 July 2018), online: Twitter
<help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/privacy-controls-for-tailored-ads>.
See Adam Wright, ‘‘Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn Offer New Ways for Advertisers to
Reach Users: The World’s Leading Social Media Platforms Have Expanded Their
Advertising Offerings Beyond Their Own Platforms as They Seek to Compete With
Google” (25 March 2015), The Guardian (accessed through LexisNexis Quicklaw); Kurt
Wagner, ‘‘This is How Facebook Collects Data Even if You Don’t Have an Account” (20
April 2018), online: Recode <www.recode.net/2018/4/20/17254312/facebook-shadowprofiles-data-collection-non-users-mark-zuckerberg>.
See Wagner, supra note 75 (on SNSs tracking users outside their platform using plugins).
See also Claude Castelluccia & Arvind Narayanan, ‘‘Privacy Considerations of Online
Behavioural Tracking” (Athens, Greece: European Network and Information Security
Agency, 2012) at 9 (22% of Internet pages have a Facebook ‘‘Like” button, 7.5% a
‘‘Twitter Re-Tweet” button, and 10.4% contain a ‘‘Google+ share” button).
Facebook, Instagram, and LinkedIn include this information about halfway through
their privacy policies. See Facebook Privacy Policy, supra note 68; Instagram Data
Policy, supra note 68; LinkedIn Privacy Policy, supra note 68. Twitter’s privacy policy is
silent on the subject and it is not clear whether or not it uses such plugins to collect
information.
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technologies that are even more intrusive than cookies to follow SNS users
around the web.78 Second, it requires third parties to share information with
SNSs that they themselves have acquired about single users. That users do not
get the chance to give informed consent regarding the collection of their data
only scratches the surface of the problem. Here, not only are users tracked across
the Internet, with networks of advertisers combining their efforts to follow users
everywhere they go, but personal data is being exchanged with their originating
user having absolutely no control over its propagation. Whereas cookies, despite
their possible intrusiveness, can be removed by a user or altogether blocked on
given Internet browsers, the same is not true of some of the technologies used like
Facebook’s ‘‘persistent ID,” which can track a given user across devices. 79
In summary, online behavioural advertising opens consumers to grave
violations of privacy and personal integrity through individualized tracking in
and outside SNSs. A crucial problem related to this practice is that it allows
individual SNSs to track consumers all over the Internet without adequately
securing their consent. Moreover, this practice has the potential to remove
consumers from being in any position where they can fully exercise their choice
and autonomy as to the dispersion of their personal data on the Internet.

(ii) Wider Effects of Behavioural Advertising
Online behavioural advertising has several large-scale effects. First, a
potential chilling effect results from unmoderated online behavioural
advertising. The Internet is not only a place where people engage in economic
transactions with various service providers — it is also a place to look for
information on important subjects, from health to politics to law, 80 and serves as
a medium for identity formation.81 Knowledge of SNSs’ and advertising
networks’ extensive tracking practices can lead some to skepticism and wariness
when using the Internet. Faced with a significant information asymmetry
between them and SNSs, users may recognize their lack of control over their
personal information and become less willing to use the Internet as a result. 82
78

79

80
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See Wright, supra note 75. For example, Facebook developed a partnership with Atlas,
which tracks Facebook’s persistent ID, thereby allowing the tracking of users across
devices and for the full customer journey, from clicking on an ad to buying a product.
Similarly, LinkedIn partnered with AppNexus to target LinkedIn users on third-party
websites.
See Zach Rogers, ‘‘With Atlas Relaunch, Facebook Advances New Cross Device ID
Based on Logged-In Users”, (28 September 2014), online: Ad Exchanger <adexchanger.com/platforms/with-atlas-relaunch-facebook-advances-new-cross-device-id-basedon-logged-in-users/>.
See Castelluccia and Narayanan, supra note 76 at 9 (noting the presence of SNS plugins
on many health websites).
See Zuiderveen Borgesius, supra note 38 at 74. A line of scholarship has notably argued
that one justification for privacy is autonomy and self-development. See Julie E Cohen,
‘‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object” (2000) 52:5
Stanford L Rev 1373.
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Second, online behavioural advertising can be so effective that it effectively
allows for manipulation of people’s thoughts and behaviours.83 This could be
done in two major ways. First, firms could detect certain weaknesses in people
from tracking them extensively and take advantage of these weaknesses to gain
an unfair advantage.84 Firms could also decide to use online behavioural
advertising to steer consumers toward certain beliefs and behaviours. 85 To take
our earlier example, a consumer who has never considered becoming vegetarian
may slowly be induced to adopt this diet through targeted advertising online,
notably ads extolling the virtues of vegetarianism.86
Third, online behavioural advertising opens up the possibility of differential
treatment according to personal characteristics, which can lead to abusive or
questionable practices. For example, advertisers could organize marketing
campaigns according to a consumer’s affluence and offer certain discounts that
would not otherwise be available to someone whose browsing history reflects
precarity. Conversely, someone whose browsing seems to indicate indigence
could be targeted with ads for nefarious lending schemes. 87

(d) Third-Party Disclosures of Data
Having described the perils of online behavioural advertising as applied to
social media, we now turn to third-party data sharing. Third-party data sharing
can occur in a number of contexts, not all of which are necessarily illegitimate.
All SNSs studied state that they share data for various purposes with third
parties in their privacy policies. However, these policies are most often unclear as
to the exact nature and purpose of the data shared. Ultimately, two major
82
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See Jerry Kang, ‘‘Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions” (1998) 50 Stan L
Rev 1193 at 1253; Zuiderveen Borgesius, supra note 38 at 78-79 (describing how people
are often confronted with take-it-or-leave-it choices when looking into engaging in a new
service on the Internet).
Ibid. at 83.
See Ryan Calo, ‘‘Digital Market Manipulation” (2014) 82:4 Geo Wash L Rev 995
(notably giving the example of scientific studies indicating women feel ‘‘less attractive”
on Monday mornings, making this a ‘‘prime vulnerability moment” during which
targeted advertising risks being more successful).
Ibid. See also Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a
Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019). In the
context of politics, see Anthony Nadler, Matthew Crain & Joan Donovan, ‘‘Weaponizing the Digital Influence Machine: The Political Perils of Online Ad Tech“ (2018), online
(pdf): Data & Society Research Institute <datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/
10/DS_Digital_Influence_Machine.pdf>; Colin J Bennett & David Lyon, ‘‘Datadriven elections: implications and challenges for democratic societies” (2019) 8:4 Internet
Pol’y Rev 3; Tal Z Zarsky, ‘‘‘Mine Your Own Business!’: Making the Case for the
Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public
Opinion” (2002) 5:1 Yale JL & Tech 1 at 40.
See Zuiderveen Borgesius, supra note 38 at 83.
Ibid. at 81.
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problems arise from this ambiguity. First of all, data sharing will most often be
done without the express consent of SNS users. Second, once a user’s personal
data has been shared, they have no way of knowing how their data is being used
and who has access to it.88 Moreover, once their personal data is in the hands of
a third party, it is possible for that third party to share it with another one,
thereby preventing further monitoring by either the SNS or the consumer.89
We have mentioned earlier how SNSs often do not give consumers a
reasonable chance to give informed consent to data collection and tracking
practices. The information asymmetry noted earlier between users and SNSs is
equally applicable to third-party data sharing. Every privacy policy consulted
states that its originating SNS uses and shares personal data for such things as
‘‘providing our services” or ‘‘improving [them].”90 There is great uncertainty in
such a formulation. The SNS could mean that it is sharing personal data
internally, in which case it is easier to keep track of it, and security measures can
be taken to prevent data breaches. Conversely, the SNS could also mean that
data is shared externally, in which case tracking the data is harder for users.
SNSs usually share personal data with third parties to provide analytics and
measurement services, notably for companies using the SNS’s built-in business
tools. As such, they provide aggregate statistics and non-personally identifiable
information (‘‘non-PII”) to businesses and advertisers to understand their ad’s
performance.91 While aggregate statistics are not the most concerning, the same
cannot be said for non-PII. For one, despite being at the centre of multiple laws
and regulations, PII has yet to be decisively defined.92 Schwartz and Solove
underscore this fact by outlining three definitions commonly used for PII. 93 It
can either be information that identifies a person,94 information that is not
publicly accessible or that is purely statistical,95 or specific categories of
information enumerated in a statute about a class of individuals. 96 In short,
88
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See Clark D Asay, ‘‘Consumer Information Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party
Disclosures” (2013) 11:5 Nw J Tech & Intell Prop 321 at 322 (outlining the two problems
of third-party disclosures of consumer information as the Incognito problem, or the fact
that consumers do not know how their data will be used, and the Onward Transfer
problem, which refers to the fact that once a consumer’s personal data is in the hands of a
third party, the consumer has simply no means of monitoring the use of his personal
data); Natalie Kim, ‘‘Three’s a Crowd: Towards Contextual Integrity in Third-Party
Data Sharing” (2014) 28:1 Harv JL & Tech 325 at 327 (‘‘the typical user only has control
over first-node sharing between user and data controller [. . .] in contrast, contextual
integrity in the second node is unclear at best”).
See LaMagna, supra note 11.
See supra note 68.
Ibid.
See Yuen Yi Chung, ‘‘Goodbye PII: Contextual Regulation for Online Behavioural
Targeting” (2014) 14:2 J High Tech L 413 at 418.
See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42 at 1828-30.
Ibid. at 1829 (presenting this approach as the so-called ‘‘tautological approach”).
Ibid. at 1829-30 (presenting this approach as the so-called ‘‘non-public approach”).
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difficulty in defining non-PII takes teeth out of privacy policies’ efforts to protect
users’ personal data. Moreover, the possibility of cross-referencing data sets to
re-identify individuals after data has been anonymized significantly dilutes any
promises made by SNSs that sharing only non-PII adequately protects users’
personal data.97
Some SNSs state that they also disclose personal data to academics for
research purposes or to authorities for legal reasons.98 While these might seem
less problematic, it is important not to downplay these as possible channels
through which privacy rights can be violated. As any third party, academics can
share their data sets with others and thus remove personal data from under the
control of SNS users, as was done in the case of Cambridge Analytica. 99
Moreover, as revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013, massive government
surveillance programs exist that can amass personal data on billions of people
worldwide with little to no due process.100 Given the breadth of information
possessed by SNS on the citizenry, personal data disclosures for legal reasons,
like any disclosure of personal data, should be questioned and examined openly.
In addition to SNS-bound disclosures of personal data, users may also
voluntarily share information with third parties, notably when using third-party
apps on a given SNS. Here, users are again faced with the problems described
above. While there is no question that third-party apps can sometimes require
some personal data in order to provide their service, their privacy notices are
usually too vague to give users a genuine idea of why and how certain data is
used. Moreover, as the Cambridge Analytica scandal underscored, third-party
apps can, without any real barrier, collect data unrelated to its purposes, which it
96
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Ibid. at 1831 (presenting the so-called ‘‘specific-types approach”).
This issue has long been underscored by scholars, leading to a plethora of proposed
solutions. See e.g. Ira S Rubinstein, Ronald D Lee & Paul M Schwartz, ‘‘Data Mining
and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches” (2008) 75
U Chicago L Rev 261 at 268 (describing how data reduction can serve to anonymize
personal data); Ohm, supra note 42 at 1742 (suggesting slowing down the flow of
information on the Internet and in society altogether to avoid a ‘‘whack-a-mole”
situation wherein any attempt at defining PII eventually proves futile as hitherto
unaddressed aspects of this extremely difficult problem eventually appear, demanding
constant re-definition of the problem); Schwartz and Solove, supra note 42 at 1865ff
(responding to Ohm’s argument by proposing new definitions of the basic elements of PII
with greater flexibility and durability); Chung, supra note 92 at 440 (suggesting the
abandonment of the PII/non-PII dichotomy to emphasize contextual integrity with a
comprehensive regulatory scheme setting ground norms for privacy regulation).
See Facebook Privacy Policy, supra note 68 (academic and legal requests); Instagram
Data Policy, supra note 68 (academic and legal requests); Twitter Privacy Policy, supra
note 68 (legal requests only); LinkedIn Privacy Policy, supra note 68 at 3.6 (legal requests
only); Google Privacy Policy, supra note 68 (legal requests only).
See Merelli, supra note 10.
See Glenn Greenwald, ‘‘NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers
daily”, The Guardian (6 June 2013), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/
06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order>.
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can then share with other third parties with no user control over the spread of
their personal data. The personality quiz-dispensing app at the origin of the
collection of the information of over 80 million user profiles only managed to
gather such a mind-boggling amount of information because it collected not only
its users’ personal data, but their friends’ too.101 In short, the value of consent for
third-party sharing of personal data to SNS apps is very dubious. Not only is
consent uninformed, but no monitoring of personal data is possible once the
information has been transferred to third parties.

(e) SNS Efforts at Self-Regulation
For the most part, all of the SNSs studied regulate their actions with regards
to advertising and third-party data sharing through their own policies and
without reference to any outside rules. While they occasionally provide rights
equivalent to certain self-regulatory principles in their policies, asserting these
rights often proves confusing and challenging.
On advertising, Facebook, Instagram, Google+ and YouTube do not
explicitly disclose any adherence to self-regulatory principles or require the
adherence of advertising partners. Twitter discloses neither adherence to nor
requirement of such principles, but it provides opt-out tools for interest-based
advertising, hidden in one page of its help centre.102 LinkedIn is the only SNS
studied to explicitly adhere to self-regulatory principles, namely the American
Digital Advertising Alliance, the Canadian Digital Advertising Alliance of Canada,
and the European Union’s European Interactive Digital Advertising Alliance, the
opt-out tools of which it provides hyperlinks.103
Other SNSs do provide some opportunity to opt out of targeted advertising,
but only from individual advertisers.104 This form of opting out has serious
drawbacks. First, consumers are unable to refuse to be subject to targeted
101
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See Alex Hern & Carol Calwalladr, ‘‘Revealed: Aleksandr Kogan collected Facebook
users’ direct messages”, The Guardian (13 April 2018), online: <www.theguardian.com/
uk-news/2018/apr/13/revealed-aleksandr-kogan-collected-facebook-users-direct-messages>.
Opt-out tools for online behavioural advertising are provided by self-regulatory
initiatives and allow an Internet user to request that participating advertising networks
stop tracking them with cookies. See Twitter, ‘‘Our Use of Cookies and Similar Tracking
Technologies” (14 August 2018), online: Twitter <help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/twitter-cookies>; ‘‘Your AdChoices” (14 August 2018), online: Digital
Advertising Alliance lang=EN>; ‘‘Opt Out of Interest-Based Advertising” (14 August
2018), online: National Advertising Initiative <optout.networkadvertising.org/?c=1#!/
>.
See LinkedIn, ‘‘Manage Advertising Preferences” (14 August 2018), online: LinkedIn
<www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/62931?query=managing%20ad%20preferences>.
See Facebook, ‘‘Can I opt out of seeing ads because I’m included in a Custom Audience?”
(14 August 2018), online: Facebook <www.facebook.com/business/help/
1415256572060999>.
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advertising, meaning their personal data will still be used to target advertising at
them. Furthermore, under this scheme, consumers can only opt out of a given
advertiser when they encounter their advertisement online. As such, their
personal data may still be used in targeted advertising until they eventually
encounter this advertiser’s ad. In any case, asking consumers to personally opt
out of every single targeted advertisement they encounter, given how utility is the
main driving factor behind SNS use,105 is simply unrealistic.
With regards to data sharing, aside from general principles provided by
governments,106 SNSs generally craft their own rules. The rules are basically the
same for each SNS: consumers must agree to the SNS’s terms of service, which
include its privacy rules, when creating their account. Thereafter, SNSs may
collect any user-generated content on the site. It is up to consumers to decide
whether to disclose more data, such as by posting pictures, videos, status
updates, etc. In the fallout of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, SNSs have
started offering users the chance to download the ‘‘archive” an SNS keeps on
them.107 The overall process of downloading this archive (which requires finding
one’s way through a labyrinth of help pages) is fairly straightforward. However,
it is of little consequence. SNSs still hold each user’s personal data and generally
give limited options to correct and delete it, taking the approach that as long as
personal data is not removed from the site by the user, the SNS may still use it
for its own purposes. To their credit, LinkedIn and Facebook have created
special tools to simplify the removal of personal data by users. 108 As far as we
know, other SNSs provide no such tool. As a result, it is practically impossible to
fully remove one’s personal data from most SNSs studied.
In any case, such tools remain antithetical to the very nature of SNSs, whose
nature is oriented towards information disclosure, and SNSs therefore
necessarily discourage users from using them. After all, it makes little sense to
remove the very content through which the core purpose of SNSs, that is,
interacting with one’s social circle, is achieved. Rather than requiring users to
sacrifice their enjoyment of the service, it would be considerably better if SNSs
addressed data protection concerns transparently and by design.
In short, self-regulatory measures taken by SNS are ineffective and fail to
address major privacy concerns of online behavioural advertising and data
sharing. SNSs give little clarity as to their uses of data and protection measures.
As a result, consumers’ rights are at great risk when using these sites.
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See Milanesi, supra note 52 (and accompanying text).
See FTC 2012 Report, infra note 129; PIPEDA, infra note 137 at Schedule 1.
See Dwight Silverman, ‘‘How to download your data from Google, Twitter, LinkedIn,
Snapchat”, Houston Chronicle (15 August 2018), online: <www.houstonchronicle.com/
techburger/article/How-to-download-your-data-from-Google-Twitter12789357.php>.
See LinkedIn, ‘‘Delete Your Personal Data from LinkedIn” (15 August 2018), online:
LinkedIn <www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/93500?query=delete%20data>.

RESPONDING TO DEFICIENCIES IN THE ARCHITECTURE OF PRIVACY

431

Part II: DATA PROTECTION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA,
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
In this Part, we look at the data protection framework enacted in the United
States, Canada, and the European Union (‘‘EU”). The picture we draw in this
section serves as the basis for the theoretical discussion we entertain in Part III.
The United States, Canada, and the EU each represent distinct regulatory
philosophies, which admit greater or lesser levels of self-regulation. Indeed, the
United States accepts an important margin of self-regulation with respect to the
personal data protection.109 Canada and the EU, on the other hand, possess
unified statutory frameworks with general and concrete obligations.110

(a) United States
The United States does not have national law on data privacy standards. 111
Rather, various interweaving state and federal sectoral laws create a patchwork
of rules that impose certain obligations on corporations with regards to data
processing.112 These are fashioned according to the specific industries and types
of data they aim to regulate.113 Notable examples include the Gramm-LeachBliley Act114 and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,115
which respectively apply to financial services and health insurance companies.
Privacy obligations under these statutes include confidentiality of non-public
personal information,116 notice and choice procedures to inform a user about the
uses and disclosures affecting their personal information, 117 and the creation of a
privacy policy for consumers.118 According to one author, under United States
109

110

111
112
113
114
115
116

We note, at this point, that the literature is far from clear as to the frontier between selfregulation and co-regulation. Furthermore, as noted by a number of scholars, regulatory
schemes characterized as self-regulatory often admit some form of government
involvement. See Florian Saurwein, ‘‘Regulatory Choice for Alternative Modes of
Regulation: How Context Matters” (2011) 33 L & Pol’y 334 at 336. See also Hirsch, “The
Law,” supra note 7; Bert-Jaap Koops et al, ‘‘Should Self-Regulation Be the Starting
Point” in Bert-Jaap Koops et al, eds, Starting Points for ICT Regulation (The Hague:
Springer, 2006).
See Joanna Kulesza, International Internet Law (London: Routledge, 2012) at 55: ‘‘US
legal academics and commentators assume that government interference in this
regulatory field is unnecessary. The US model ensures only a few positive rights. The
intention is that self-regulation and market forces jointly are to establish the protection
of data and privacy. The European model, however, assumes that the government is
responsible for privacy protection for nationals, and to this end it is the government that
should demonstrate active involvement.”
See Jeff Kosseff, Cybersecurity Law (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2017) at 1.
Ibid. at 318.
Ibid.
See Pub L No 106-102, 113 Stat 1338 (1999).
See Pub L No 104-191, 110 Stat 1936 (1996).
See 15 USC § 6801 (1999) (confidentiality of personal information collected by financial
services).
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law, privacy is considered not so much a conceptually fulsome right so much as a
good. As such, privacy protections function as carve-outs: a firm can collect all
the data it wants except that excluded by statute.119
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) most closely approaches the role of
centralized privacy regulator in the United States.120 Its authority extends over
any company engaged in interstate and international commerce. 121 Section 5 of
the Act, prohibiting ‘‘unfair or deceptive practices” affecting commerce, allows
the FTC to order a company to cease and desist certain practices that do not
provide sufficient data protection to their customers and subsequently fine them
if they fail to abide by the order.122 It also allows the FTC to commence enquiries
and civil proceedings against major Internet-related companies, notably SNSs. 123
In each of its cases, the FTC takes an individualized approach to determine
whether a company’s privacy practices are ‘‘unfair or deceptive.”124 In addition
to its investigative powers and standing before US courts in proceedings relating
to its statute, the FTC may promulgate quasi-judicial orders (called ‘‘consent
orders”)125 compelling acts and imposing certain conditions respecting a
company’s continued operation after it has been found to have engaged in
unfair or deceptive practices, 126 which the FTC vigorously enforces.127 Finally,
the FTC may also promulgate regulations in furtherance of its statutory
objectives.128
Beyond its legislative and judicial capacities, the FTC is also involved in
monitoring the market and monitoring its evolutions. As such, it has published
117
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Ibid. at § 6802 (use and disclosure in the financial services industry); 45 CFR § 164.502
(use and disclosure of personal health information).
See 15 USC, supra note 116 at § 6803; 45 CFR, supra note 117 at § 164.520.
See Lindsey Barrett, ‘‘Confiding in Con Men: US Privacy Law, the GDPR, and
Information Fiduciaries” (2019) 42 Seattle UL Rev 1057 at 1068.
Other federal agencies, like the Federal Communications Commission or the Department of Health and Services, may also act as a form of centralized data regulator. The
FTC’s reach, however, is much broader. See Kosseff, supra note 111 at 2.
See Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub L No 63-203, § 4, 38 Stat 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 USC § 41) [FTC Act].
Ibid. at 15 USC § 45. See also Michael L Rustad, Global Internet Law in a Nutshell (St.
Paul: Westgate Academic Publishing, 2016) at 203 (on resorting to Section 5 of the FTC
Act to enforce data protection).
See Rustad supra note 122 at 203.
See Kosseff, supra note 111 at 320.
See ibid. at 6.
See e.g. ‘‘In re Facebook, Inc, Decision and Order” (27 July 2012), online: FTC
<www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf>;
Google, Inc, 152 FTC 345 (2001).
Google was notably sanctioned to pay USD 22.5 million for violating a consent order
already imposed by the FTC in the Google Buzz case. See Kosseff, supra note 111 at 320.
See FTC Act, supra note 121 at § 15.
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numerous reports and recommendations on data protection. To this point, these
have been mainly aimed at self-regulation, thus reflecting the economic paradigm
in the United States.129 As regards data protection, the FTC has reiterated
several self-regulatory principles that businesses should adopt:130
.
Notice, meaning ‘‘those collecting data must disclose their information
practices before collecting from consumers”;131
.
Access, meaning consumers must be given options to direct how their
personal information may be used for purposes other than those to which
they originally consented;132
.
Consumer education, meaning ‘‘companies should educate consumers
about their privacy practices”;133
.
Security, meaning ‘‘data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure
info collected from consumers is secure from public use”;
.
Privacy by design, meaning ‘‘companies should incorporate privacy
protections for consumers at each stage of product development”; 134
.
Enforcement, meaning ‘‘the core principles of privacy protection can only
be effective through enforcement mechanisms including: industry selfregulation, the creation of private rights of action, and government
enforcement through civil and criminal penalties”;
.
Simplified consumer choices, meaning ‘‘companies should provide consumers with the option to decide what information is shared about them,
and with whom”;135
.
Transparency, meaning ‘‘companies should disclose details about the
collection and use of consumers’ information, as well as providing access
to that data.”136

(b) Canada
Canada has enacted data protection obligations at the federal level through
the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(‘‘PIPEDA”).137 PIPEDA was passed in response to the 1998 European
Union’s Data Protection Directive. One of the Directive’s major aspects was
129
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See e.g. United States, Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumers in an Era of
Rapid Change (Washington, DC: FTC, 2012) [FTC 2012 Report]; United States, Federal
Trade Commission, Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising
(Washington, DC: FTC, 2009) [FTC 2009 Report]; United States, Federal Trade
Commission, Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (Washington,
DC: FTC, 1999).
Definitions are taken from Kosseff, supra note 111 at 162.
See FTC 2012 Report, supra note 129 at 61-64.
Ibid. at 64-71.
Ibid. at 71-72.
Ibid. at 22-35.
Ibid. at 35-60.
Ibid. at 60-72.
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that EU Member States had to ensure adequate levels of privacy protection for
data transfers in another jurisdiction. PIPEDA was therefore enacted to ensure
that Canadian firms provided an adequate level of protection for data coming
from the EU.138
PIPEDA operates under the federal government’s competence in trade and
commerce under s 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.139 Given that Canadian
provinces can pass laws respecting property and civil rights in the province under
s 92(13)140 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and local or private matters under s
92(16)141 of the same, they can enact their own laws respecting data
protection.142 However, since commercial activity involving interprovincial and
international personal data flows is regulated by PIPEDA, this legislation sets
the data protection benchmark for most Internet-related firms.143
PIPEDA sets out broad principles in relation to personal information flows,
which are all set out in Schedule 1 of the Act:
.
Accountability, meaning ‘‘[a]n organization is responsible for personal
information under its control and shall designate an individual or
individuals who are accountable for the organization’s compliance with
the following principles.”144
.
Identifying purposes, meaning ‘‘[t]he purposes for which personal information is collected shall be identified by the organization at or before the
time the information is collected.”145
.
Consent, meaning ‘‘[t]he knowledge and consent of the individual are
required for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information,
except where inappropriate.”146
137
138
139

140
141
142

143

144
145
146

See SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA].
See Michael Power, The Law of Privacy (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2017) at 65.
See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(2), reprinted in RSC 1985,
Appendix II, No 5.
Ibid., s 92(13).
Ibid., s 92(16).
See Power, supra note 138 at 7-11 (enumeration of all federal and provincial statutes
respecting privacy in Canada).
Only a few general data protection statutes applicable to private entities within a
province have been enacted. See Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63;
Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5; An Act respecting the protection of
personal information in the private sector, CQLR, c P-39.1. Provincial data protection
laws otherwise apply only to specific sectors and types of data, like health, or to the
provincial public sector. See e.g. Health Information Act, RSA 2000, c H-5 (legislating
data protection rules in the Alberta healthcare system); Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165 (legislating data protection rules in the
British Columbia public sector).
See PIPEDA, supra note 137 at Schedule 1, s 4.1.
Ibid. at Schedule 1, s 4.2.
Ibid. at Schedule 1, s 4.3.
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.

Limiting collection, meaning ‘‘[t]he collection of personal information shall
be limited to that which is necessary for the purposes identified by the
organization. Information shall be collected by fair and lawful means.” 147
.
Limiting use, disclosure, and retention, meaning ‘‘[p]ersonal information
shall not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which it
was collected, except with the consent of the individual or as required by
law. Personal information shall be retained only as long as necessary for
the fulfilment of those purposes.”148
.
Accuracy, meaning ‘‘[p]ersonal information shall be as accurate, complete,
and up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be
used.”149
.
Safeguards, meaning ‘‘[p]ersonal information shall be protected by
security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information.”150
.
Openness, meaning ‘‘[a]n organization shall make readily available to
individuals specific information about its policies and practices relating to
the management of personal information.”151
.
Individual access, meaning ‘‘[u]pon request, an individual shall be
informed of the existence, use, and disclosure of his or her personal
information and shall be given access to that information. An individual
shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the
information and have it amended as appropriate.”152
.
Challenging compliance, meaning ‘‘[a]n individual shall be able to address
a challenge concerning compliance with the above principles to the
designated individual or individuals accountable for the organization’s
compliance.”153
Each principle is enriched by more specific obligations under it. PIPEDA
provides a few exceptions to these obligations.154 PIPEDA directs a balancing of
interests philosophy155 to interpret the scope of the principles in different
situations.156 This philosophy aims to take notice of the context under which
PIPEDA takes effect — a data economy, where business objectives are tightly
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Ibid. at Schedule 1, s 4.4.
Ibid. at Schedule 1, s 4.5.
Ibid. at Schedule 1, s 4.6.
Ibid. at Schedule 1, s 4.7.
Ibid. at Schedule 1, s 4.8.
Ibid. at Schedule 1, s 4.9.
Ibid. at Schedule 1, s 4.10.
Ibid., ss 7-11.
Ibid., s 3: The purpose of this Part is to establish, in an era in which technology
increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules to govern the
collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a manner that recognizes the
right of privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information and the need of
organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information for purposes that a
reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances.
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linked with the collection, use, and disclosure of data — and the need to protect
citizens’ personal integrity.157 In contextualizing data protection, the Privacy
Commissioner also monitors the market and privacy innovations and produces
research reports for businesses and the public.158
Complaints can be filed with the federal Privacy Commissioner under s 11 of
PIPEDA. The Commissioner has to then investigate the complaint 159 and
eventually either dismisses it160 or publishes a report outlining findings and
recommendations.161 The Commissioner may then enter into a compliance
agreement with the respondent162 or initiate proceedings before the Federal
Court to ultimately have that Court order remedies and other measures aimed at
remedying a breach of the Act.163 Finally, the Privacy Commissioner may audit
the data protection practices of a company if they have ‘‘reasonable grounds to
believe that the organization has contravened” the Act.164 Contrary to its United
States and EU counterparts, the Privacy Commissioner does not have the power
to impose fines or make orders directly, something that its head has criticized. 165

(c) European Union
Until May 2018, the European Union’s data protection legislation was the
Data Protection Directive. The General Data Protection Regulation (‘‘GDPR“)
that has since come into force replaces the Directive and updates its various
obligations. The Regulation is comprehensive and enumerates obligations that
are binding on a data controller — meaning the entity who ‘‘alone or jointly with
others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data” 166
156
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160
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165
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See e.g. Englander v. Telus Communications Inc., 2004 FCA 387, 2004 CarswellNat 4119,
2004 CarswellNat 5422 (F.C.A.) at para. 46:
All of this to say that, even though Part 1 and Schedule 1 of the Act purport to protect the right
of privacy, they also purport to facilitate the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information by the private sector. In interpreting this legislation, the Court must strike a balance
between two competing interests. Furthermore, because of its non-legal drafting, Schedule 1 does
not lend itself to typical rigorous construction. In these circumstances, flexibility, common sense
and pragmatism will best guide the Court.

See Power, supra note 138 at 75.
See PIPEDA, supra note 137, s 24.
Ibid., s 12.
Ibid., s 12.2.
Ibid., s 13.
Ibid., s 17.1.
Ibid., s 15.
Ibid., s 18.
See Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner, ‘‘Facebook Allegations Underscore
Deficiencies in Canada’s Privacy Laws” (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy Commissioner,
2018), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2018/
oped_180326/> [Office of the Privacy Commissioner Op-ed].
See EC, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of The European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
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— and data processor — meaning the entity ‘‘which processes personal data on
behalf of the controller.”167
Data processing, under the GDPR, is governed by the guiding principles,
which are expanded in later provisions of the Regulation. Contrary to the United
States and Canadian law, under the GDPR, a data controller has the burden of
demonstrating their adherence to the principles:168
.
Lawfulness, fairness, and transparency, meaning personal data must be
‘‘processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the
data subject”;169
.
Purpose limitation, meaning personal data must be ‘‘collected for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner
that is incompatible with those purposes”;170
.
Data minimization, meaning personal data must be ‘‘adequate, relevant
and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they
are processed”;171
.
Accuracy, meaning personal data must be ‘‘accurate and, where necessary,
kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that
personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which
they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay”; 172
.
Storage limitation, meaning personal data must be ‘‘kept in a form which
permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for
the purposes for which the personal data are processed”;173
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data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General
Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJ, L 119/1 at art 4(7) [GDPR].
Ibid., art 4(8).
Ibid., art 5(2). See also Paul Voigt and Axel von dem Bussche, The EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Practical Guide (Cham: Springer International
Publishing, 2017); Zuiderveen Borgesius, supra note 38 at 99-102 (analysis of GDPR
principles).
See GDPR, supra note 166, art 6 (‘‘Lawfulness of processing,” including the obligation to
ascertain consent or necessity to data processing), art 7 (‘‘Conditions for consent”), art
12 (‘‘Transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the
rights of the data subject”), art 13 (‘‘Information to be provided where personal data are
collected from the data subject”), art 14 (‘‘Information to be provided where personal
data have not been obtained from the data subject”), art 15 (‘‘Right of access by the data
subject”), art 30 (‘‘Records of processing activities”), art 33 (‘‘Notification of a personal
data breach to the supervisory authority”), Chapter 4, s 4 (‘‘Data protection officer”).
Ibid., art 21 (‘‘Right to object”), art 22 (‘‘Automated individual decision-making,
including profiling”).
Ibid., art 9 (‘‘Processing of special categories of personal data”), art 18 (‘‘Right to
restriction of processing”).
Ibid., art 16 (‘‘Right to rectification”), art 18 (‘‘Right to restriction of processing”).
Ibid., art 17 (‘‘Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)”), art 18 (‘‘Right to restriction of
processing”).
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.

Integrity and confidentiality, meaning personal data must be ‘‘processed in
a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including
protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against
accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or
organisational measures.”174
Similar to the United States and Canada, privacy by design — the idea that
technologies should be designed with ensuring privacy as a primary
consideration — is included in the GDPR.175 The Regulation also prescribes
that Member States must establish a ‘‘supervisory authority” empowered to
monitor the application of its various rules.176 Additionally, a supervisory
authority can act proactively in various respects. Notably, it can monitor
relevant data protection developments,177 give advice as to best practices, and
adopt standard contractual clauses for firms to use in their privacy policies. 178
The Regulation also favours the adoption of industry codes 179 and
certifications180 as possible regulatory tools to be monitored by another
competent authority.
The Regulation orders that supervisory authorities be granted sometimes farreaching investigative powers, which include the power to carry out data
protection audits and obtain access ‘‘to any premises [. . .] including to any data
processing equipment and means.”181 Additionally, they may issue warnings and
reprimands and order performance of various acts by a data controller or
processor.182 Finally, a data subject may submit a complaint to the supervisory
authority in the Member State where they reside.183 This might lead a
supervisory authority to issue an order, or a fine.184 The Regulation, however,
does not bind authorities to represent the complainant in court to obtain a
remedy.
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Ibid., art 22 (‘‘[Right to be free from] automated individual decision-making, including
profiling”), art 24 (‘‘Responsibility of the controller”), art 25 (‘‘Data protection by
design and by default”), art 32 (‘‘Security of processing”), art 35 (‘‘Data protection
impact assessment”), art 36 (‘‘Prior consultation”), ch 5 (‘‘Transfers of personal data to
third countries or international organisations”).
Ibid., art 25.
Ibid. at ch 6.
Ibid., art 57(i).
Ibid., art 57(j)
Ibid., art 41.
Ibid., art 42
Ibid., art 58(1).
Ibid., art 58(2).
Ibid., art 80.
Ibid., art 83. As underscored in Part III, fines can be very significant.
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(d) Comparing the US, Canada, and the EU’s Data Protection Framework
To bring to light the different choices made by each jurisdiction, we compare
their data protection framework through three angles: regulatory design, the
place of industry codes, and enforcement powers.

(i) Regulatory Design
Of the three jurisdictions studied, the United States has the data protection
regime that places the most emphasis on self-regulation. At the other end, the EU
takes the most interventionist approach to data protection, with comprehensive
data regulations binding on member states. Canada has recently adopted
amendments to PIPEDA that bring it closer to the GDPR, although the powers
of the Privacy Commissioner are not as strong as those under the GDPR.
Although the FTC has greatly promoted industry codes since the early
Internet,185 and although many such codes remain in use,186 this has not stopped
the FTC from intervening under its competence to investigate unfair and
deceptive practices, which is now subject to a full-fledged legal test. 187 As such,
the FTC framework should theoretically achieve, albeit through greater legal
exegesis, a good ambit of protection, similar to other jurisdictions, despite its
broadness.188 Its publications clarifying data protection principles and constant
enforcement actions against companies ultimately delineate clear obligations by
which corporations need to abide.189 The FTC’s attempts to draw out principles
of data protection ultimately serve a role similar to Schedule 1 of PIPEDA or
Article 4 of the GDPR (although we should underscore that the GDPR
principles are expanded to create full-fledged obligations in other provisions of
the Regulation). The added benefit of this approach is that the American
regulatory scheme is more flexible and can follow industry developments more
closely. This, however, is done at the expense of clarity, as the degree to which
the industry can effectively adhere to clear and sufficiently precise standards
becomes reduced. As a result, corporations are less certain what their obligations
are — or consumers, their rights. The opposite is true in the EU, whose
comprehensive Regulation establishes clear standards and duties on both
185
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See Hirsch, ‘‘The Law,“ supra note 7 at 459 (historical overview of data protection and
self-regulation in the United States). See also FTC 1999 Report, supra note 129; FTC
2009 Report, supra note 129.
See e.g. ‘‘Guidelines for Online Privacy Policies” (7 August 2018), online: Online Privacy
Alliance <www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines/>; ‘‘NAI 2018 Code of
Conduct” (7 August 2018), online (pdf): Network Advertising Alliance < https://
www.networkadvertising.org/sites/default/files/nai_code2018.pdf >.
See Kosseff, supra note 111 at 4-5 (describing a three-part test for determining unfair or
deceptive practices).
Moreover, the FTC’s authority over data protection was confirmed quite clearly by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799
F.3d 236 (3d Cir., 2015).
See supra note 129.
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controller and processor — something Canada somewhat provides, but not the
United States.

(ii) Place of Industry Codes
All three jurisdictions encourage industry codes as part of their data
protection framework.190 In all three cases, the regulator shows interest in seeing
certain (perhaps more fastidious) aspects of data protection being self-regulated
with sectoral rules that address privacy issues with greater precision. What then
distinguishes industry codes according to each jurisdiction is the general
framework within which they exist and the enforcement mechanisms backing
them. The general framework within which industry codes exist affects them
insofar as they create the basic rules that are then substantiated by industry
codes.
For example, in the United States, where the only legislative guidance on
data protection is the broad duty arising under Section 5 of the FTC Act,
voluntary codes inject content into the general obligation. In Canada and the
EU, on the other hand, industry codes are drafted in response to laid-out and
relatively precise obligations under the law, especially in the context of the
GDPR. Industry codes are then not jurisgenerative or boundary-setting so much
as they may express legal rules in a more contextualized way. Their function is
therefore less significant than in the United States, though they can still be very
useful.
Since industry rules are adopted by industry members and their teeth depend
on members’ active and continuous adherence to them, they are more difficult to
enforce, whereas statutory rules can be enforced through state sanction. The
United States and Canada take a completely hands-off approach to monitoring
industry codes.191 Indeed, the FTC and the Privacy Commissioner encourage
industry codes, but they do not take part in their enforcement, contrary to the
EU, which authorizes specially-appointed bodies to monitor their compliance
and take measures to lead parties into compliance.192

(iii) Enforcement
Agencies in charge of enforcing data protection legislation have different
powers to enforce their rules. The FTC can autonomously impose a fine on a
defaulting party only after it fails to comply with a cease-and-desist order. The
fines cannot exceed USD 10,000.193 For this reason, the FTC will normally enter
into consent orders with firms, and the breach of these orders can be sanctioned
by a court with millions of dollars in penalties.194 The Canadian Privacy
190
191
192
193
194

Ibid.; PIPEDA, supra note 137, s 24; GDPR, supra note 166, art 40.
See supra note 129.
See GDPR, supra note 166, art 41.
See FTC Act, supra note 121 at § 45.
Ibid.
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Commissioner works similarly but cannot impose fines or make orders. As such,
the Commissioner is entirely reliant on the Federal Court to issue and enforce
compliance orders.195 Conversely, the EU GDPR empowers supervisory
authorities with much greater powers to order fines and compel certain
actions. Supervisory authorities can autonomously impose fines as high ‘‘20
000 000 EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide
annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher” 196 and
make various orders to make a controller or processor comply with the
provisions of the GDPR.197
Thus, EU supervisory authorities, under the GDPR, have the most direct
power over non-compliant firms. Since the FTC and the Canadian Privacy
Commissioner cannot directly fine a firm for insufficient data protection
practices, their ability to intervene in each case is limited. As a result, they will
often settle with the non-compliant firm rather than going through full-fledged
court proceedings to induce compliance and order remedies for serious violations
of data privacy.198 The Canadian Privacy Commissioner has himself expressed
multiple times that he would like his office to have more investigative and
inspection powers of company data protection practices to keep private firms in
check.199

(e) Criticisms
Several criticisms can be formulated for each data protection framework.
These put in perspective the challenges of balancing adequate data protection
with encouraging businesses to reap the benefits of Big Data to innovate.
The United States, as we have described, has a very fractured data protection
framework. Privacy is protected through a patchwork of statutory provisions in
each state and at the federal level, providing for privacy in discrete contexts, but
no universally applicable protection exists at the statutory or constitutional
level.200 This leads to the creation of a ‘‘consumer privacy regime primarily
concerned with ease of compliance for companies, and [shielded from] more
consumer-protective modifications.”201 Accordingly,
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See PIPEDA, supra note 137, s 24.
See GDPR, supra note 166, art 83.
Ibid., art 58(2).
See Kosseff, supra note 111 at 320.
See Office of the Privacy Commissioner Op-ed, supra note 165; Canada, Office of the
Privacy Commissioner, ‘‘Appearance before the Standing Committee on Access to
Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI) on the Study of the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)” (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy
Commissioner, 2017) [Appearance before the Standing Committee].
See Barrett, supra note 119 at 1068.
Ibid.
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the patchy protections of sectoral regulation, the failures of notice and
choice without strong enforcement to compensate for them, and the
narrow definition of what kind of harms merit judicial or administrative redress reflect this conceptual and legal diminishment of privacy,
and often keep protections for it from being effective.202

Furthermore, actions to prevent data breaches by the FTC are often unclear, as
the FTC often does not comment on its decisions, and unsatisfying, as its
enforcement actions are often limited or even absent.203
The interventionist framework of the EU’s GDPR, whose approach most
closely aligns with the government regulation approach among the three
jurisdictions studied, entails that national data protection agencies in charge of
regulating data protection have a lot more oversight and power. These are seen
by the EU as necessary to protect the privacy of Internet users. Adopted in 2016,
the GDPR entered into force only in May 2018 to give companies time to adjust
to the major changes that the Regulation would bring about.204 Two years in, it
is difficult to estimate the law’s long-term effects. The Regulation addresses
many of the problems that experts found in its predecessor, the Data Protection
Directive.205 However, as noted by multiple observers, the GDPR has had
several negative consequences in the short term.206 For example, a survey of
mergers and acquisitions professionals from Europe, Africa, and the Middle East
from July 2018 revealed that 55% declared having worked on transactions that
did not go through due to concerns about companies’ compliance with the
GDPR.207 Furthermore, 56% of respondents in a survey from October 2018 of
data protection professionals at organizations subject to the GDPR said their
organizations are far from complying with the GDPR or will never comply. 208
Finally, French and UK (which was still a member of the EU at the time) data
protection agencies expressed being overwhelmed by the demands brought on by
the Regulation and concerned about not having enough resources to enforce
202
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it.209 Hence, while expansive regulation ensures that a consumer’s rights are
protected on paper, it does not mean that the data protection agency will be
efficient or effective in practice.
Canada falls between the United States and the EU in terms of regulation.
While establishing guiding principles and distinct obligations, it does not go as
far as the EU in terms of the obligations imposed on firms handling personal
data and the powers vested in the regulator to take action in each case. This
means that while data protection obligations under Canadian law are better
defined, the means to enforce them are deficient in significant respects. Like in
the United States, the statutory framework presumes that firms will govern
themselves or can simply be nudged into compliance.

PART III: PROACTIVE CO-REGULATION AS THE PATH FORWARD
FOR DATA PROTECTION ON SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
The discussion so far shows that there is a real concern with respect to the
nature of data protection regulation and the effects of that framework in each
jurisdiction. Elements of self-regulation and government regulation have their
advantages and disadvantages from a regulatory perspective. While excessive
reliance on self-regulation, as in the United States, points to several major
shortcomings, heavy regulation, as can be found in the EU, can also burden the
industry and can sometimes be difficult for even a local regulator to apply. At the
same time, an incomplete set of tools limits the range of solutions a regulatory
agency can pursue in each case. As such, we aim to argue in this Part that in
searching for a regulatory approach that bridges these concerns, legislators
should adopt elements of both self- and government regulation, an approach
which has been named ‘‘co-regulation.”210 In particular, regulators should
consider regulatory negotiations as one of the most powerful tools to create rules
that are effective and adapted to business reality.

(a) Government, Self- and Co-Regulation: Pros and Cons
Self-regulation has been adopted and is still favoured by several on the
assumption that, as a regulatory framework, it procures several benefits that
cannot be achieved through government regulation. For example, proponents of
self-regulation argue that it (a) ‘‘overcome[s] the problem of information deficits
209
210
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of state regulation because [private actors] benefit from greater expertise and
special skills within the industry”; (b) ‘‘[is] faster and more flexible than state
regulation, mostly because [it is] not bound by statutory procedures to the same
extent as state regulation”; (c) ‘‘reduce[s] regulatory cost to the state’s arid
implementation costs in general, especially because profit-driven companies are
supposed to carry out the self-regulatory process more cost efficiently”; and (d)
‘‘[is] applicable in areas sensitive to state regulation,” such as where regulation
might impede on protected freedoms.211 In the context of data protection,
arguments are also presented to the effect that competition should push Internetcentred firms to ensure their users’ data is protected.212
Co-regulation and government regulation advocates argue that these
benefits, while theoretically potent, fail in practice. They argue self-regulation
(a) ‘‘provide[s] symbolic policy with weak standards, ineffective enforcement,
mild sanctions and limited reach, because [it] often appl[ies] only to those who
voluntarily participate and not to all members of an industry”; (b) ‘‘result[s] in
self-service by the industry, with public interests being neglected vis-à-vis private
interests, and the outsourcing of regulation may also result in a loss of know-how
on the part of regulators, thus exacerbating existing information asymmetries”;
(c) ‘‘entail[s] the danger of cartels and other anticompetitive behaviour, resulting
from close cooperation between companies in self- and co-regulatory regimes
and the dominance of large, long-established companies in self- and coregulation may produce solutions that discriminate against smaller enterprises
and newcomers”; and (d) ‘‘decrease[s] the democratic quality of regulation,
especially owing to lack of accountability, transparency, legal certainty and the
like.”213
While stressing that there is no one form of co-regulation,214 its proponents
consistently argue that the collaborative relationship it fosters between
government, industry, and other stakeholders will encourage firms to share
insider knowledge of the industry more than if the government were drafting
rules alone.215 Ultimately, co-regulation would achieve cost-effectiveness,
efficiency, effective enforcement, and enough flexibility to evolve along with
the business landscape, which government regulation and self-regulation cannot
achieve on their own.216 Government and business would ultimately enjoy
improved relations, sparking more creative and innovative responses to social
problems, as well as making each party accountable to the other.217
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On the other hand, co-regulation also has its criticisms. Detractors first argue
that the industry, conscious of the knowledge imbalance that exists between
itself, the regulator, and the public, will use its advantageous position to broker
weaker standards. Secondly, co-regulation risks taking negotiations between
government and industry behind closed doors, which prevents criticism from civil
society from influencing public policy. Thirdly, co-regulation still does not
address the problem of enforcement, whereby firms may still be allowed a degree
of leniency if they have to enforce rules against themselves. Fourthly, ultimately,
rather than bringing a collaborative spirit to business-government relations, legal
obligations to shareholders will often overshadow good faith attempts at
responding to societal concerns.218
Co-regulation has nevertheless been the subject of a number of compelling
case studies, which give insight into its possibilities and effectiveness. 219 A
notable one is Dennis Hirsch’s study of Dutch privacy codes.220 Through its
Personal Data Protection Act, the Netherlands has adopted a comprehensive
statutory scheme that implements the broad principles of the EU Data
Protection Directive and allows industries to adopt their own codes that
specify how the statutory requirements will apply in their particular context.
These codes have been adopted in twenty sectors, including financial services.
They are approved by the Dutch Data Protection Authority and enforced as a
binding administrative decision.221 Rubinstein summarizes Hirsch’s conclusions
regarding the codes as follows:
(1) the need to clarify the broad terms of the PDPA as they applied to
specific sectors and in some cases to forestall direct government
regulation created sufficient incentives for companies to participate;
also, the negotiation process (2) built sufficient trust between regulators
and industry to promote both information sharing and joint problem
solving between them, thereby taking advantage of industry expertise,
and (3) led to more tailored, workable, and cost-effective rules.222

Thus, while bearing in mind that co-regulation is not a magic bullet and is only as
effective as its design makes it, there is great promise in promoting contextspecific regulation and information-sharing among the regulator, regulated
firms, and other stakeholders.223 As we will argue shortly, the form of regulatory
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negotiations embodied in Dutch privacy codes offers the best solution to regulate
data protection on SNSs.

(b) Transparency and Accountability: Why the Self-Regulation of SNSS
Failed
In the context of SNSs, self-regulation failed to provide adequate data
protection due to its substantial deficiencies in transparency and
accountability.224 It has failed in transparency because neither the regulator
nor consumers can verify that SNSs are complying with privacy obligations.225
As shown in Part I, consumers are in an extremely unbalanced relationship with
SNSs. Rarely are they aware of how their information is collected and used, and
they are even less aware of the amount of information. Furthermore,
information regarding a firm’s data practices has usually been sanitized in
documentation provided in help sections and privacy policies or is written with
so much imprecision it is impossible to concretely grasp what is, in fact, being
described.226 In short, consumers have scarce control over how their data is
collected. This, along with the general lack of information about the internal
workings of a company, ultimately makes protecting consumers’ personal data
very difficult for the regulator and protecting one’s own privacy very difficult for
consumers.
Moreover, at least in the United States and in Canada, accountability
mechanisms greatly lack in teeth as the regulator’s powers to make orders and
impose fines are limited, which makes their oversight less effective and
efficient.227 Furthermore, under the American and Canadian regimes, the
regulator does not have powers to audit without reasonable grounds to believe
that the SNS has infringed the law228 or conduct unannounced inspections on
SNS premises to ascertain their compliance with privacy standards. In the
absence of sufficient market incentives to adopt and implement robust privacy
practices, the regulator’s supervisory function becomes especially crucial. While
proponents of the free market claimed that consumers would gravitate towards
products with better privacy protections and that competition would promote
223
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the progressive sharpening of privacy tools by the industry, thus creating an
Internet landscape with robust protections of personal data, this is not what
happened in fact.229 As outlined in Part I, consumers, despite their claims to
greatly caring about their privacy, are unwilling to switch to SNSs with stronger
privacy practices if their social network does not also migrate to it. As a result,
the innovative impulse at the root of competition and underlying the selfregulatory paradigm is severely undermined.230
Accountability, as several authors have pointed out, has been further
hindered by the fact that industry codes have failed to produce an effective
regulatory framework.231 Rules set by industry codes are often lenient and not
aimed at instilling long-term changes in practices in the biggest firms. 232
Moreover, given that these codes are based on voluntary compliance and major
firms have no compelling reason to take on additional obligations, their
proposed rules ultimately receive lax implementation.233 Additionally, industry
codes are limited in scope and thus only cover certain activities, while leaving
others in a regulatory gap. For example, SNSs might voluntarily adhere to an
advertising industry code, but other activities with business partners, for
example, data aggregation, might not be covered under an existing industry code,
leaving SNSs free from even self-generated constraints. This opens the door to
unscrupulous practices, as well as diminishes the value of industry codes and
their purported oversight.

(c) Co-Regulation as the Path Forward for Data Protection on SNSS: A Few
Principles and Ideas for the Future
To fill current gaps in transparency and accountability, as well as craft
regulation that can be implemented effectively in practice, it is necessary, more
than ever, to craft regulation that achieves its objectives in the most efficient
manner possible. This can only be achieved through co-regulation characterized
by intense collaboration between the regulator and regulated firms. Indeed, some
of the main difficulties in regulating data protection on SNSs is their complexity
and opacity. Each SNS platform is unique, as is its interaction with third parties.
Furthermore, information about each SNS’s internal operations is limited. Thus,
while SNSs benefit from an oligopolistic position in the market, their complexity
and the lack of public information about them make context-specific regulations
characterized by significant information-sharing appropriate and necessary. Due
229
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to inherent complexity of the subject, a one-size-fits all approach is more likely to
be ineffective.234
To this end, the legislator should first adopt a framework legislation setting
out clear obligations. Concurrently, an industry code governing data protection
on SNSs that specifies and supplements the obligations contained in the
framework legislation for their particular context should be adopted following
regulatory negotiations involving the regulator, regulated firms, and other
stakeholders.

(i) Co-Regulating SNSs: A Proposal
An adequate co-regulatory model aimed at data protection must exist under
a framework law that clearly sets out the various principles, rights, and
obligations that are necessary to ensure minimum levels of transparency and
accountability to consumers. These include, among others, adequate
requirements for consent, as well as provisions of information on how to
assert rights with regards to one’s personal data, namely the right to know who
has access to one’s data and what that person or entity is using it for, the right to
secure data processing and to hold accountable people along the data chain, and
the right to restrict data processing. As well, persons and entities collecting data
must have clear obligations to limit their collection only to what the consumer
has explicitly consented to (accordingly, pre-emptive data collection, that is,
collecting data only on the assumption that it will have some use in the future,
should be forbidden), to use adequate technological safeguards to prevent
breaches while storing personal data, and to keep records of processing activities
and ensure third-party processing of data is done with sufficient measures to
protect data’s confidentiality during processing. On their end, third parties that
process data must have a stated obligation to be open and transparent with
consumers and the data collector. In addition to this, they should only process
data as necessary to achieve the objectives to which a consumer has consented.
These rules would serve as benchmarks for protecting consumers’ data, thus
creating a basic protection that consumers can always fall back on in the absence
of clear regulation on the subject.235 They should be set out in a way similar to
the GDPR, codifying certain obligations that, while relatively precise, still allow
room for the industry and other stakeholders, such as consumer protection
associations, to determine the specific acts by which the industry will be deemed
to have complied with its obligations under the law via regulatory negotiation.
For example, while the framework law would clearly outline under what
circumstances consent to the collection of one’s personal data would be valid, the
parties would still have some freedom to determine what tools and mechanisms
are to be used to obtain a consumer’s consent and what features these can have
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to limit the risks of confusion and misinformation, in conjunction with other
market stakeholders.
Legislating certain fundamental data rights, following the approach taken
notably in the EU,236 ensures that consumers are treated fairly throughout the
use of their data and provides them with adequate ability to verify how their data
is being used and to retain control over it.237 At the very least, it gives them a
clear and solid legal basis to assert their rights before SNSs using their data.
Enacting minimum transparency rules also proves an effective way of increasing
accountability.238 Because effective transparency obligations lead to the exposure
of careless practices, SNSs become more at risk of legal liability, which
incentivizes more assiduous privacy self-enforcement practices, to the benefit of
consumers.239
Transparency and accountability can also be increased through empowering
the regulator with more extensive powers to audit and inspect firms, including
SNSs, as well as make orders and issue fines to keep Internet firms
accountable. 240 For one, this would ensure greater ease of regulatory
enforcement and would facilitate accountability of Internet firms before
consumers. One major problem of self-regulation to this day, and which has
led to its recurrent inefficiency in enforcement, is the fact that sanctioning a
firm’s negligent data practices once in a blue moon is insufficient to ensure selfregulated industries remain accountable. Past examples show that when the
regulator chastises a firm for breach of privacy in a self-regulatory industry, the
firm will immediately trigger reactive measures and give multiple assurances that
it recognizes its mistake and has implemented robust protocols to prevent similar
regulatory failure from happening in the future. However, once the public eye
has moved on and the firm is no longer scrutinized, with no more incentive to
follow rigorous guidelines, the firm will often end up drifting back to its negligent
practices.241 As a result, in addition to ramping up transparency regarding data
processing activities of SNSs, it is also important that firms see continuous
monitoring to ensure compliance with privacy obligations. To this end, privacy
audits and unannounced inspections have been recommended as potential means
to keep companies in check.242 Both methods are relatively inexpensive, and,

236
237
238
239
240

241
242

See Barrett, supra note 119.
See Lievens and Valcke, supra note 15 at 564.
See Zuiderveen Borgesius, supra note 38 at 100.
Ibid.
See Office of the Privacy Commissioner Op-ed, supra note 165; Appearance before the
Standing Committee, supra note 199; Houle & Sossin, supra note 227 at 160, 165-66.
See Hirsch, “The Law,” supra note 7 at 467.
See e.g. Appearance before the Standing Committee, supra note 199 (the Privacy
Commissioner referred to submissions made by various stakeholders across Canada,
including, among other suggestions, that proactive methods such as audits be employed).

450 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[19 C.J.L.T.]

when done periodically, they can push a company to uphold rigorous data
protection standards.
SNSs’ role within this framework is at the technical level, where their role is
to aid in determining implementation. Here, we see a process of regulatory
negotiations being used to achieve efficiency in cooperation with other
stakeholders, such as consumer advocacy groups and other actors in the
technology sector.243 Regulatory negotiations (or ‘‘negotiated rulemaking”) is a
‘‘statutorily-defined process by which agencies formally negotiate rules with
regulated industry and other stakeholders as an alternative to conventional
notice-and-comment rulemaking.”244 Contrary to conventional rulemaking, in
which the government drafts legislation, then solicits testimonies from industry
representatives and other interest groups, regulatory negotiations envisage a
regulatory process in which various parties work toward a consensus on how to
regulate a given subject matter.245 Regulatory negotiations have already been
discussed at length in academic literature since their initial proposal and have
been applied notably to devise environmental regulation. 246 Several legal
scholars have endorsed using these in the context of data protection. 247
Regulatory negotiations are noted for five main strengths.248 First, they are
oriented towards problem-solving as they lead to the engagement of various
parties with one another, which produces new and innovative solutions. Parties
in a negotiation are induced into disclosing information they would not
otherwise share in order to present their views and counter the other side’s
arguments, thus allowing for the proposition of sharper, more sophisticated and
informed arguments and filling informational gaps.249 Facing other viewpoints
leads to zeroing in on each party’s respective interests and developing more
243
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creative solutions, as parties are encouraged to see rule-drafting not as a zerosum game, but as a problem that can be solved to the benefit of everyone at the
table.250 A sub-product of this is that rules are generally arrived at more quickly
and more cost-effectively.251
Second, regulatory negotiations allow for participation of interested and
affected parties. By bringing in different interest groups in the regulatory process,
the information base used to create the rule is more complete, which leads to a
better appraisal of the reality of the problem and a greater likelihood of the
adequacy of the proposed rule.252 The confluence of different parties ensures that
different expertise will be brought to the negotiating table. For example, a
consumer rights advocate and an industry representative bring vastly different
perspectives. The former can speak to the effects of corporate policies and
practices on the lives of ordinary consumers and how best to protect their
interests, while the latter brings a vast amount of knowledge, not only on their
type of product, but also on the industry, how its actors behave, and how it is
likely to evolve in the coming years. They may also offer insight as to the
practical and technical realities which might hinder the implementation of certain
rules.253
Third, the rules arrived at following regulatory negotiations are provisional
in that they are temporary and subject to periodic revision. This ensures that
rules can be tailored and responsive to the specific context for which they are
drafted, and thus more effective. After being approved, rules are continually
monitored so that parties can assess their effectiveness on an ongoing basis and
either improve them or make adjustments to account for new developments in
the industry and other relevant factors. 254 This characteristic entails long-term
effectiveness and increased ability to react and adapt to innovations and
changing conditions related to the subject matter of the regulation. 255 A further
corollary is that such provisionalism requires continuous disclosure of
information, which further enhances transparency.
Fourth, regulatory negotiations allow for accountability that transcends
traditional public and private roles in governance. Depending on the role the
250
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regulator takes in the negotiation and in the framework law underpinning the
negotiation, it is possible for parties to agree on alternative accountability
mechanisms, insofar that they are allowed by law or the regulator, such as
auditing, standard-setting organizations, or certification of bodies themselves
certified by the regulator.256
Fifth, regulatory negotiations allow the regulator to be both engaged and
flexible. Depending on the role that the regulator wants to take, they can act
either as ‘‘a minimal standard-setter,” ‘‘a convenor-facilitator of multi-party
negotiations that are designed to produce goals, standards, and the measures
necessary to judge whether they have been attained,” or ‘‘a capacity-builder of
institutions capable of partnerships in coregulation.”257 Despite the emphasis
that regulatory negotiations put on private parties, the regulator still plays a role
in shaping outcomes, which allows for the public interest, nonetheless, to remain
represented during the negotiation. Engaging in a negotiation process, contrary
to claims by some scholars, does not undermine the regulator’s authority. 258
Ultimately, they retain the final authority to impose their rules to shape the
negotiation process and enact regulations if discussions ultimately fail. 259
The collaborative governance offered by regulatory negotiations, overall,
proves more desirable than government regulation. Traditional rulemaking is
characterized by great power imbalance: the very actor soliciting comments
ultimately has all the power to determine what is enacted as law. 260 As a result,
the adversarial component of rulemaking is exacerbated, and parties tend to
adopt extreme positions in order to influence policy.261 Additionally, under
traditional adversarial rulemaking, parties might be less forthcoming and open to
disclosing certain information which may undermine their bargaining
position.262 Regulatory negotiation seeks to overcome these challenges by
bringing together affected groups and having them negotiate applicable rules for
a given situation. Such negotiations are ultimately effective because they are in
parties’ best interests:263 the subject area at the heart of the negotiation is either
already government-regulated, or soon will be,264 which means the industry has a
compelling interest in influencing the drafting of the regulation. In the past,
regulatory negotiations have notably been used in the environmental context to
bind polluters to sustainability goals, thereby achieving better results than might
256
257
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otherwise be politically achievable under traditional rulemaking. 265 As a result of
this process, the regulation that is eventually given binding force by the regulator
also has more legitimacy and is thus easier to enforce. 266 Moreover, in addition
to enforcement by the regulator, parties can also enforce the negotiated rule
through alternative means, like privately-funded ‘‘certified observers,” who
independently monitor the industry’s compliance with the rule.267 Finally,
regulatory negotiations ultimately prove much more flexible and responsive to
specific conditions than other means of drafting and implementing regulation,
thus allowing for more rapid policy improvements. 268
This process should prove attractive to SNSs as it allows them to advance
their economic self-interest while responding to public demands for
accountability and privacy assurances, and it allows them to have a real
impact on the formation of new industry rules. Given SNSs’ great proficiency in
technological innovations, including AI, they are in a prime position to advise
other stakeholders on possible technological avenues that could allow them to
comply with their obligations more efficiently. This is beneficial for consumers as
well. SNSs know their product and the industry the best. They possess the most
valuable insight into how technological innovation is likely to progress in the
years to come.269 For example, AI technologies, which are becoming increasingly
widespread in online behavioural advertising, are a technology that could be
regulated through regulatory negotiations. Due to the immense benefits this
technology offers through automation and the significant impacts it can have on
consumers’ commercial activity, it is only fruitful that industry and consumer
protection groups come together to address its regulation moving forward. The
industry’s knowledge, when brought into a negotiation conference, can allow for
privacy measures that, while effective, can be more readily implemented as their
greater flexibility and pragmatism will more closely fit business realities.
Concurrently, bringing in inputs from consumer groups regarding
technological innovations can ultimately further the adoption of privacy by
design. As stakeholders engage in a collaborative discourse regarding new
technologies and the practical implementation of data protection standards,
ensuring technologies at the epicentre of industry developments comply with
these standards will naturally flow from the discussion. To take our earlier
example, discussions on the requirements for consent will necessarily arrive at
questions of ‘‘just-in-time” disclosures, opt-in consent, one-stop dashboards for
opting out of targeted advertising, and other technologies that facilitate privacy
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self-management.270 As a result of being part of a negotiation process, SNSs are
more likely to effectively incorporate these privacy features into their interface.
Finally, collaborative governance, which is central to the co-regulatory
model presented here, is most effective when it is accompanied by the political
will to mandate administrative agencies to firmly tackle a given problem. Thus,
absent a willingness to significantly change the current regulatory paradigm and
meaningfully sanction abuses of personal data, the industry may have much less
incentive to take part in the negotiation process. Fortunately, however, firms
have historically been willing to adopt voluntary codes of conduct when faced
with the possibility of stricter regulation.271 Thus, despite their shortcomings,
there may be a future for industry codes under co-regulation.

CONCLUSION
This article aimed to demonstrate the shortcomings of self-regulation as a
regulatory paradigm for SNSs and argue for the adoption of a co-regulatory
model that allows for proper balancing of both economic prosperity and
consumer protection. As the role that SNSs play in people’s daily lives increases
dramatically, and as vast amounts of personal data are collected without regard
for consumer integrity, the current model has failed to adequately protect
consumers’ privacy and make SNSs accountable for their actions. Given the
significant amounts of personal data each SNS possesses on its users, and given
the competitive value of this data, SNSs are in a powerful position in today’s
economy, as Big Data and AI are extracting considerable value out of this data.
Moreover, SNSs have wide powers to collect and process personal data within
and outside their ecosystem, unbeknownst to consumers. While proponents of
self-regulation argued that competition would lead the market to develop better
privacy practices as consumers would choose services with better privacy
options, insights from behavioural economics show that this has simply not been
the case. All of this showcases SNSs’ unequal relationship with their users.
We looked at the data protection law of three jurisdictions: the United
States, Canada, and the European Union. The United States possesses the most
self-regulated data protection landscape, with a broad rule encompassing most
subject matters and a regulatory architecture that favours settlements with
companies at fault. Canada is slightly more regulated, offering data protection
principles, but with similar powers as its United States counterpart. The EU, on
the other hand, has the most rigorous data protection framework of the three,
with comprehensive data protection regulation and powerful enforcement tools.
After looking at the benefits and shortcomings of government regulation,
self-regulation, and co-regulation, we examined why self-regulation is ineffective
for SNSs and proposed a co-regulatory model based around regulatory
negotiations and clear data protection obligations to be used in the place of
270
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self-regulation. We argued that such a model would respond to two major
shortcomings of self-regulation, namely lack of transparency and accountability,
and would promote a cost-effective, innovative, and tailored regulatory
approach to SNSs. At the same time it would provide a focused regulatory
solution and foster a greater exchange of information between the regulator,
SNSs, and stakeholders.

